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The History of Love – Nicole Krauss (2005) 
Taken From “Age of Silence”  
 
The first language humans had was gestures. 
There was nothing primitive about this language that flowed 
from people‟s hands, nothing we say now that could not be said 
in the endless array of movements possible with the fine bones 
of the fingers and wrists. The gestures were complex and subtle, 
involving a delicacy of motion that has since been lost 
completely. 
 
During the Age of Silence, people communicated more, not less.  
Basic survival demanded that the hands were almost never still,  
and so it was only during sleep that people were not saying 
something or other. 
 
Naturally there were misunderstandings 
and yet, because people knew how easily they could happen,  
because they didn‟t go around with the illusion that they 
understood each other perfectly well, they were used to 
interrupting each other to ask if they‟d understood correctly. 
 
Because of the frequency of these mistakes, over time the 
gesture for asking forgiveness evolved into the simplest form. 
Just to open your palm was to say: Forgive me. 
 
If at large gatherings or parties, or around people with whom 
you feel distant, your hands sometimes hang awkwardly at the 
ends of your arms- if you find yourself at a loss for what do with 
them, overcome with sadness that comes when you recognize 
the foreignness of your own body- it‟s because your hands 
remember a time 
when the division between mind and body, brain and heart, 
what‟s inside and what‟s outside, was so much less. 
 
It‟s not that we‟ve forgotten the language of gestures entirely. 
The habit of moving our hands while we speak is left over from 
it. Clapping, pointing, giving the thumbs-up : all artefacts of 
ancient gestures. Holding hands, for example, is a way to 
remember how it feels to say nothing together. 
 
And at night, when it‟s too dark to see, we find it necessary to 
gesture on each other‟s bodies to make ourselves understood. 
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Once upon a time... 
Sprookjes bestaan niet. Kikkers veranderden nooit in prinsen, van 100 jaar slapen na een 
speldenprik kan je enkel bekaaid afkomen, en een doctoraat schrijft zichzelf niet, laat 
staan dat je er lang en gelukkig van leeft. Toch is het achteraf, na vier voorbijgevlogen 
jaren, niet zo gek moeilijk om gebald in minder dan een boek leesplezier, een 
pseudosprookje te vertellen... 
 
 “Er was eens een meisje dat door een raad van wijzen op pad werd gestuurd. Ze lieten 
haar zweten op examens en presentaties, op het uitvoeren van experimenteel onderzoek 
en het neerschrijven van bevindingen. Het werd een boeiende, gevarieerde tocht. Een 
leger consumenten en marketeers stond klaar om het kleine psycholoogje te 
vertrappelen, maar kreeg haar niet klein. Een stoffig tot de verbeelding sprekend 
laboratorium deed haar hoofd bonken, als ze dacht aan de impact van de studenten die 
er taakjes volbrachten op het al dan niet slagen van haar levenswerk. Geregeld werd ze 
op aangename missies gestuurd. Ze waande zich prinses in een Duits kasteel in 
Rauischholzhausen, verkleedde zich in San Francisco, zag krokodillen bij de Everglades 
en dompelde zich onder in een St-Petersburghiaanse jacuzzi. Ze genoot van het uitzicht 
in een Rotterdamse skyscraper, en vanop vulkanen in Clermont-Ferrand. Helaas kon ze 
niet ontsnappen aan in line dancing in Oklahoma, noch aan een Leuvense gang met 
serre-allures waar ventilatoren op volle toeren sputterden. Aan het einde van het 
avontuur besloot ze iedereen te bedanken die haar hoofdrol in het verhaal deed 
verbleken. Ze riep de halve wereld bij zich en vertelde hen dat ze haar euforie over het 
einde van het avontuur graag wilde delen, en dat het niet half zo leerrijk had kunnen zijn 
zonder de steun van velen: 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why must we seek explanation in either Body or Mind. It is a false dichotomy.  
 
 
 
(Gibson, 1979) 
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SITUATED CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 
Ample scientific evidence points to the fact that people are influenced by 
contextual factors when making decisions. It is now widely accepted that consumers do 
not always have stable preferences (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998). Rather than being 
rational (i.e., coherent and consistent over time or across choices) consumers construct 
different preferences depending on the context (Amir & Levav, 2008; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). A large variety of, at first sight unrelated, research findings calls 
attention to these situational effects. The fluency with which information is processed 
often impacts judgments (for a review, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Lee & Labroo, 
2004; Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 
1998). Emotional states of others or oneself can influence consumers‟ decisions (Darke, 
Chattopadhyay, & Ashworth, 2006; Griskevicius, Shiota, & Nowlis, 2010; Pham, 1998; 
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005); and so do 
current goals (Gao, Wheeler, & Shiv, 2009; Van den Bergh, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2008). 
Even physical experiences have been shown to alter decision making (Hung & Labroo, 
2011; Van den Bergh, Schmitt, & Warlop, in press). An overarching framework that helps 
explain why abstract thinking is affected by such diverse factors is provided by the 
perspective of situated cognition. Although different definitions of situated cognition 
exist, the general idea is that cognitive processes do not operate apart from the 
environment, but interact strongly with it (Clark, 1997; Schwarz, 2006b; Smith & Semin, 
2007; Wilson, 2002). When consumers decide what (not) to consume, physical, 
emotional, motivational and other situational factors guide information processing. 
Hence, if consumers‟ preferences are constructed at the time of decision making, they 
are not stable, but vary across contexts (Schwarz, 2006a). Context- sensitive cognition is 
adaptive in that it allows people to notice problems or opportunities that arise on their 
way, it allows interference with ongoing thoughts, if necessary (Schwarz, 2006b). 
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Decades ago, Gibson (1979) advocated that researchers should take an ecological 
perspective to visual perception. Conceptualizations of the perceptual system should 
consider the idea that people interact with their environment in perceiving the world. 
Following the perspective of situated cognition, I would like to argue that, as for visual 
perception, the environment provides rich sources of information that should be 
incorporated in our conceptualizations of decision strategies and attitude formations. 
Gibson has very nicely put into words how the focus of perception should be broadened 
to the study of a complete human perceptual system in interaction with its environment:  
“We are told that vision depends on the eye, which is connected to the brain. I 
shall suggest that natural vision depends on the eyes in the head on a body 
supported by the ground, the brain being only the central organ of a complete 
visual system” (Gibson, 1979, p1) 
In an effort to conceptualize our research findings within the framework of 
situated cognition, I sketch three core ideas of this approach, suggested by Robbins and 
Aydede (2008): cognition is embedded, embodied and extended. The three essays in this 
dissertation defend the ideas of embedded and embodied cognition. Before turning to an 
overview of the essays, I define the building blocks of situated cognition, and discuss 
theories and research findings of embodied cognition in particular, to develop an overall 
picture of our theorizing.  
1. Embedded cognition: thinking is for the sake of action, and therefore 
cognition always builds on interactions between an actor and the world. For 
example, a tall person will prefer another chair to sit on than a shorter person. 
It has been shown that people are remarkably accurate in estimating the 
instrumentality of their environment (Ishak, Adolph, & Lin, 2008; Mark & 
Vogele, 1987; Warren, 1984). How comfortable a chair is, is not a given, but 
rather an online constructed belief based on characteristics of both the 
perceiver and the object. 
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2. Embodied cognition: perceptions, actions and introspective states are the 
building blocks of information processing (Barsalou, 1999; Damasio, 1989; 
Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg, 1997; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, 
Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). It is argued that thinking cannot rely on 
symbols that provide meaning by simply referring to other meaningless 
symbols (Harnad, 1990), but that meaning can only be provided by a bottom-
up sensory approach in which symbols are grounded in the original objects 
and bodily states. 
3. Extended cognition: thinking can be offloaded to the environment to save 
mental capacity. For example, finger counting strategies can be used for 
numerical representations (Brozzoli, et al., 2008; Di Luca, Granà, Semenza, 
Seron, & Pesenti, 2006). Similarly, knowledge can be spread over different 
individuals, who can be consulted or “plugged in like an external hard drive 
onto one‟s own mind” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Thompson & Fine, 1999).  
 
EMBODIED COGNITION 
Embodied cognition is inspired by William James‟ view on the interdependence 
of bodily sensations, feelings and thoughts (1890). As James stated, “no mental 
modification ever occurs which is not accompanied or followed by a bodily change 
(p5).” Here is a thought experiment. When confronted with a bear, we might consciously 
tell ourselves that we should feel anxious, watch out and ready ourselves to flight. It 
would be more adaptive however if our cognitive system does not make abstraction from 
inputs it receives from the outer world, but constantly interacts and feeds back to 
emotional and bodily states. Luckily this is exactly how cognition works. When 
confronted with a bear, we feel our heart beat, focus all our attention on the threatening 
bear, and our muscles ready themselves to run away. All these changes are intertwined, 
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or with James‟ words “without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter 
would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth 
(p450).”  
Embodiment theories argue that mental simulations of original bodily states are 
the core of knowledge representation (Barsalou, 2008). For example, when thinking 
about happiness, the zygomaticus major, or the muscle that turns lips into a smile, is 
contracted (Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 
2009). When seeing a smile on someone‟s face, in order to interpret its meaning, several 
brain regions may be activated (e.g., reward centers in the prefrontal cortex to activate 
associated attachment information, the amygdala for its role in motivation detection, 
and motor regions responsible for mimicry) (Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess, 
2010). Thus, rather than representing the meaning of, for instance, an enjoyment smile 
as one abstract amodal symbol, different modalities of the brain co-operate in 
representing and reactivating information (Barsalou, 1999). Most embodiment theories 
specify mental simulations on the level of the brain, but simulations can even spread to 
muscular activity and bodily sensations like heartbeat and arousal. Research about 
action- and emotion processing has been particularly fruitful in showing that similar 
brain regions, or muscles react to actually experiencing and remembering, imagining, 
perceiving or reading about an event (Beilock, Lyons, Mattarella-Micke, Nusbaum, & 
Small, 2008; Foroni & Semin, 2009; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Niedenthal, et al., 
2009; Pulvermüller, 2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Speer, Reynolds, Swallow, & 
Zacks, 2009; Wicker, et al., 2003).  
Embodiment theories also argue that bodily states can accommodate abstract 
concepts, like power, or love (Boroditsky & Prinz, 2008; Niedenthal, Eelen, & Maringer, 
2011). Metaphors suggest that the abstract world is conceptualized physically (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980). People describe abstract ideas in concrete terms. For example, the 
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abstract notion of valence (i.e., positivity) has been shown to be grounded in perceptual 
dimensions such as brightness (i.e., good is bright and bad is dark, Meier, Robinson, 
Crawford, & Ahlvers, 2007) and auditory pitch (i.e., high pitch sounds mean good 
things) (for a review, see Crawford, 2009). Not only do people have linguistic 
expressions for abstract concepts, perceptual experiences seem to represent them. Take 
for instance the concept of power as an illustration. Children experience the fact that 
most powerful people are taller than they are. Hence, one important and common 
feature that accompanies the experience of social power is the perception of differences 
in vertical space. Indeed, it was found that mental representations of power include 
spatial location information with powerful being up and powerless being down 
(Schubert, 2005). Another example is that the activation of the anterior insula underlies 
both the physical sensation of warmth (Craig, Chen, Bandy, & Reiman, 2000) and 
psychological sensations of warmth like feelings of social exclusion, trust, and empathy 
(Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; King-Casas, et al., 2008; Rilling, et 
al., 2008; van den Bos, van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2009).  
If emotions, actions and perceptions form the basis of how knowledge is 
represented, then it is not surprising that bodily states experienced at the moment of 
information processing „color‟ decision making. Experiencing physical coldness 
decreases prosocial behavior (IJzerman & Semin, 2009; Williams & Bargh, 2008). 
Stepping backwards leads to stronger focus on what is relevant in a given situation 
(Koch, Holland, Hengstler, & van Knippenberg, 2009). When participants were 
unobtrusively induced to contract the zygomaticus major, or the smiling muscle, they 
found cartoons more funny (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Receiving feedback about 
an achievement task in an upward posture made participants feel more proud than in a 
slumped posture (Stepper & Strack, 1993). Carrying a heavy clipboard made the topic of 
the survey seem more important (Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009). Moreover, 
recent research shows that consumer decisions can also be affected by body feedback. 
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Nodding the head, as when agreeing, while watching positively valenced products, 
increased positive attitudes towards these products compared to shaking the head 
(Förster, 2004). When flexing arms, people become more reward seeking than when 
people stretch arms, because flexion of arms is associated with approaching positively 
valenced stimuli (Van den Bergh, et al., in press). Hence consumers who shop by 
carrying a shopping basket (i.e., arm flexion), bought more vices at the cashier desk than 
consumers who shop by pushing a shopping cart (i.e., arm extension). In a study by 
Hung and Labroo (2011), it was found that students who had a health goal and held a 
pen firmly in their hand while buying a snack for lunch were more likely to resist 
unhealthy temptations than when they were holding the pen loosely, suggesting that 
when making a fist, people exert more willpower. These illustrations highlight that body 
feedback can alter, facilitate or interfere with information processing. 
In the studies presented in this dissertation, I will demonstrate effects of situated 
cognition. More specifically, together with my co-authors, we investigate how body 
feedback affects product evaluations and choices, and feelings of power. The underlying 
assumption is that the environment and bodily states are incorporated in consumer 
decision making. In the first essay we demonstrate that easy-to-grasp products, as 
manipulated by the orientation of product handles, are more attractive than difficult-to-
grasp products and investigate the context-dependency of simulating actions. In the 
second essay, we focus on how doing things differently increases novelty seeking among 
consumers. Finally, in our last essay we explore the different meanings of crossing the 
arms in front of the body and show that dependent on prior feelings of self-worth, arm 
crossing can reduce or increase feelings of power. In an introduction to each essay, I 
highlight the embedded and embodied nature of our research findings. 
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INTRODUCTION TO ESSAY 1 
Embodied cognition suggests that motor behavior related to products that 
consumers interact with is mentally represented. The theory also suggests that this 
motor behavior is reactivated if consumers think about products. Indeed, neurological 
evidence has shown that the left ventral premotor cortex, which is active while 
performing actions, was also activated when naming tools (Chao & Martin, 2000). 
Behavioral paradigms – e. g., by means of response latencies – have been used to show 
that both grasping actions for picking up objects and more functional actions related to 
the intentional use of objects are activated during information processing about these 
objects (Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008; Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Additionally, research about 
processing fluency indicates that fluently processed stimuli are judged more positively 
(Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Therefore, when it feels easier to interact with a product, 
this may increase the attractiveness of the product. We hypothesized that right-handers 
would prefer products with product handles oriented rightwards, because these are easy-
to-grasp with the dominant right hand. 
Importantly, we theorize that feelings of fluency can result from two types of body 
feedback. The first is that people simulate possible actions with objects and experience 
fluency when a well-learned action can be mapped on what is perceived. This simulation 
process relies heavily on the perceiver‟s automatic bodily reactions. It is a quick, 
effortless simulation process based on a learned grasping pattern. The other simulation 
process is more embedded in the environment, or driven by the interaction between 
perceiver and situational cues: a feeling of fluency can arise when a biomechanically 
efficient action is mapped on what is perceived. For instance, when actions with the right 
hand are prevented, even right-handers may prefer products with handles oriented 
leftwards. This process is more cognitively demanding, because it asks for a comparison 
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of all possible actions with objects based on what the body and the product permit at the 
time of observation. 
In four studies we find evidence that people prefer easy-to-grasp products. Right-
handers prefer products with handles oriented rightwards over products with handles 
oriented leftwards. Additionally, we show that the automatic simulation process occurs 
for rigid right-handers: when mentally taxed and other decision strategies do not 
overrule the feeling of fluency, they have a preference for rightly-oriented products. 
Conversely, flexible right-handers scan the environment actively for action cues to detect 
how the body and object map, which is mentally effortful, and show a preference for 
rightly-oriented products when mental resources are not taxed. As flexible right-handers 
rely more heavily on situational cues, they have a preference for products with leftwards 
handles (i.e., reversed) when making use of the left hand.  
 
INTRODUCTION TO ESSAY 2 
In our second essay, we investigate how deviations from common experiences 
trigger openness to new experiences. In times of change, consumers seem to move away 
from their favorite products, and choose unfamiliar products instead (Wood, 2010). 
Research about habitual thinking has shown that people with strong habits detect fewer 
changes in the environment and search less for alternative actions (Verplanken, Aarts, & 
van Knippenberg, 1997). As it is easier to change habits in new environments (Wood, 
Tam, & Guerrero Witt, 2005), it is possible that novel behavior leads to a mindset of 
openness to change. However a more specific prediction follows from research about 
curiosity. Novelty is arousing and leads to exploration (Berlyne, 1950). Therefore we 
hypothesized that performing actions in novel ways should increase explorative 
consumption, or novelty seeking.  
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Four studies demonstrate that unusual actions amplify exploration, even if the 
triggering actions are trivial and irrelevant to the choice context. First of all, consumers‟ 
need for uniqueness (Tian, Bearden, & Hunter, 2001), or the interest in buying and 
combining unconventional and innovative products in order to express one‟s 
uniqueness, is increased by performing an unusual action. Unusual actions also make 
people more likely to choose uncommon and new products. We rule out several 
alternative explanations for these findings. The embedded nature of cognition is 
highlighted in this essay, because we show that new circumstances are incorporated in 
ways of thinking. Engaging in novel behavior leads to exploration more than usual 
behaviors do. Furthermore, we show that people are good at ignoring contextual cues in 
their judgments when they are aware of the incidental character of novelty in the 
environment.  
 
INTRODUCTION TO ESSAY 3 
Many body postures and movements have been shown to affect decision making. 
For example, arm flexion is associated with approach, and arm extension with 
avoidance; and inducing these movements impacts preference construction (Cacioppo, 
Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Förster, 2003; Van den Bergh, et al., in press). Most often 
embodiment research has focused on main effects of body postures on behavior and 
decision making (but see, Schubert, 2004). However given the situated nature of 
cognition, we hypothesize that not all bodily states lead to similar behavioral effects for 
all consumers. Every individual has a different lifetime of experiences that may be of 
influence for decision making. At first sight very similar bodily states may have different 
meanings. For instance, smiling may be an instantiation of dominance, masking, 
enjoyment, or affiliation (Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Niedenthal, et al., 2010). Its 
contingency in appearance with other bodily states (e.g., presence or absence of eye 
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contact, crow‟s feet, erectness of posture, etc.) or situational cues may reveal its true 
meaning.  
In this essay, we study arm crossing and its different meanings and effects on 
feelings of power and reliance on contextual cues. Crossing the arms in front of the body 
is often seen as an expression of low power, but also of defensiveness and unyielding 
(Argyle, 1988; Bull, 1987; Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010; Gifford, 1994; Huang, Galinsky, 
& Gruenfeld, 2011). We propose that arm crossing activates defensiveness or unyielding 
dependent on feelings of self-esteem. People with high self-esteem feel more in control of 
situations than people with low self-esteem (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002), and 
feeling in control leads to psychological reactance against persuasion attempts, whereas 
feeling out of control increases conformity with persuasion attempts by others (Biondo & 
MacDonald, 1971). Hence, we suggest that arm crossing lowers feelings of power and 
increases reliance on contextual cues for people with low self-esteem, because the 
posture has a high chance of activating defensiveness. Conversely, we suggest that arm 
crossing will increase feelings of power and decrease reliance on contextual cues for 
people with high self-esteem, because the posture is most likely to be associated with 
unyielding.  
We show the predicted pattern of results on power feelings and show that 
reduced feelings of power lead to greater reliance on contextual cues. Finally, we discuss 
the gap between people‟s perceptions of effectiveness of arm crossing (i.e., protection 
against persuasion attempts) and actual impact on behavior.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
13 
ESSAY 1 
Two Routes to Motor Fluency: When Ease of Grasping 
Affects Product Evaluation and Choice 
1.  
 
ABSTRACT 
We investigate how flexible and rigid right-handers‟ product evaluations and 
choices are differently impacted by orientation cues. Two types of body feedback cause a 
preference for easy-to-grasp products . First, experiencing motor fluency can result from 
scanning the environment for cues that indicate how to interact with the world. We show 
that flexible right-handers pay more attention to situational constraints than do rigid 
right-handers and show a preference for products that are biomechanically most efficient 
to grasp. Additionally, distraction from orientation cues attenuates the effect. Second, 
experiencing motor fluency can result from an automatically activated well-learned 
grasping tendency, as we find for distracted rigid right-handers. This research highlights 
the importance of actions in preference construction and underscores the flexible and 
situated nature of cognition. 
Keywords: embodiment, situated cognition, handedness, processing fluency, 
product orientation, grasping 
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INTRODUCTION 
Have you ever noticed that most bottled detergents on supermarket shelves are 
oriented with their handle towards the right of the brand label? The reason for this is 
that we live in a right-handed world, designed by and created for right-handers. About 
90% of the world population is right-handed (Perelle & Ehrman, 1994). Orientation cues, 
like the right-handed handles of bottled detergents, are traces of handedness in our 
product universe. An important but unanswered question is whether these orientation 
cues have an impact on preference construction. Physical actions may steer our mind, 
such that presenting products in line with how one would grasp them may increase their 
likeability. In support of this notion, Ping, Dhillon and Beilock (2009) found preliminary 
evidence that right-handers prefer tools with the handle oriented rightwards to tools 
with the handle oriented leftwards. They called this phenomenon the motor fluency 
effect.  
However, not all right-handers are exclusively right-handed (Annett, 1972). Some 
right-handers tend to use their right hand more rigidly than others. For example, while 
right-handers most often use their right hand to pick up pieces when making a puzzle, 
actual proportions vary from slightly over 50% to almost 100% of all grasps. Rigid right-
handers use their right hand almost exclusively in contralateral space, but more flexible 
right-handers can switch easily to their left hand (Gonzalez & Goodale, 2009; Gonzalez, 
Whitwell, Morrissey, Ganel, & Goodale, 2007). Diversity in hand preference may have 
important implications for the influence of orientation on product evaluations. Flexible 
right-handers are biomechanically more efficient (Bryden, Pryde, & Roy, 2000), but may 
spend more cognitive resources on planning actions than rigid right-handers. Flexible 
right-handers‟ attention to orientation cues may then feed into their preference 
construction. The main contribution of this paper is to increase understanding of the 
motor fluency effect, and to demonstrate the important moderating influence of 
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handedness flexibility. We specifically investigate how flexible and rigid right-handers‟ 
decision making processes, like product evaluation and choice, are differently impacted 
by orientation cues. We examine the processes that underlie motor fluency and explore 
how degree of right-handedness influences the use of orientation cues in decision 
making processes.  
Hypothesis development 
An increasing amount of research indicates that bodily sensations are a 
fundamental part of human cognition (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Niedenthal, Eelen, & 
Maringer, 2011). Theories of embodied cognition highlight that people‟s experiences 
constitute a set of perceptions, emotions and actions that are stored in memory and form 
the basis for subsequent thought (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). In addition, 
the ease with which consumers can process (information about) stimuli affects their 
attitudes towards these stimuli (Lee & Labroo, 2004; Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 
1987; Novemsky, et al., 2007; Reber, et al., 1998), such that fluent processing leads to 
higher likeability. When consumers shop in a store, physical features of products are 
salient. Hence, the ease with which products are grasped, could lead to an increase in 
attractiveness. Alter and Oppenheimer (2009) stipulated that body feedback is an 
instantiation of embodied cognitive fluency. The concept of motor fluency was developed 
by Beilock and colleagues as a new source of fluency to emphasize the functional links 
between cognition and action (Beilock & Holt, 2007; Yang, Gallo, & Beilock, 2009). For 
example, expert typists prefer letter combinations that are easy to type, even when no 
motor behavior is involved, whereas novices do not show such preferences (Beilock & 
Holt, 2007). Motor fluency relies on evidence that observing a stimulus leads to covert 
simulation of actions that are associated with the stimulus. Such simulations can provide 
feedback about the ease or fluency of action and influence evaluations of objects. Product 
preferences could be directly influenced by the affective nature of processing fluency 
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(Schwarz, 2004). Hence, in line with Ping et al.‟s finding (2009), we hypothesize that in 
a shopping context right-handers will prefer products with a handle oriented rightwards 
to products with a handle oriented leftwards.  
H1:  Right-handers prefer products with a handle oriented rightwards over 
products with a handle oriented leftwards. 
We further theorize that feelings of fluency can result from two types of body 
feedback. We elaborate on these two mechanisms and describe how they are related to 
flexibility of handedness.  
First, when people simulate possible actions with objects, they may experience 
fluency when a well-learned action can be mapped on what is perceived. This 
mechanism, as implicitly suggested by Ping et al. (2009), follows directly from automatic 
motor simulation of acting on objects. Behavioral and neuropsychological studies have 
shown that merely seeing a product activates an action tendency to manipulate it (Chao 
& Martin, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2004). Additionally, if a product is presented in 
line with previous experiences, it is easier to process and recognize (Helbig, Graf, & 
Kiefer, 2006). Some right-handers have a stronger tendency than others to perform 
actions with the right hand (Bryden, et al., 2000). Thus, our body, and more specifically 
handedness, determines what is easy or difficult to grasp. Following this reasoning, it 
seems plausible that rigid right-handers experience motor fluency when objects are 
oriented with the handle rightwards, more than flexible right-handers do. This would 
result from a lifetime of grasping experiences with the highly preferred right hand, and a 
largely bodily driven simulation process.  
The second mechanism that we put forward is that, when people simulate 
possible actions with objects, the experience of fluency may arise if a biomechanically 
efficient action can be mapped on what is perceived. In addition to motor simulation, 
people may have to scan the environment for cues that permit grasping. Motor fluency 
  
 
17 
involves the (imagined) physical interaction between consumers and products. Bodily 
constraints and product features reveal together how objects can be used (Gibson, 1979; 
Mark & Vogele, 1987). Therefore, from the perspective of situated cognition (Schwarz, 
2006b; Smith & Semin, 2004; Wilson, 2002) arguing that thinking is for doing (James, 
1890), we assume that flexible right-handers rely more heavily on situational constraints 
for planning actions, and hence might need to process information about orientation 
cues more deeply than do rigid right-handers. Thus, if not only body-specific, but also 
product-specific characteristics, and connections between the two may play a role in the 
emergence of motor fluency and hence preference construction, then flexible right-
handers may show a stronger motor fluency effect than rigid right-handers. This 
mechanism implies that flexible right-handers pay more attention to orientation cues in 
their environment than rigid right-handers, and that they would prefer products with a 
handle oriented leftwards, if this orientation is biomechanically more efficient. This 
would however not affect preference construction of rigid right-handers, because their 
hand preference is not driven by biomechanical efficiency.  
H2:  Flexible right-handers pay more attention to orientation cues than rigid 
right-handers. 
H3: Left-handed actions switch flexible right-handers‟ preference to products 
with a handle oriented leftwards, whereas left-handed actions do not 
influence preference construction for rigid right-handers. 
We do not specify beforehand whether flexible or rigid right-handers show 
stronger motor fluency effects, because we have outlined two different types of body 
feedback that can lead to experiences of motor fluency and it is difficult to predict which 
of both mechanisms will lead to stronger effects. However, distraction should have 
opposite effects on preference construction for rigid and flexible right-handers. 
According to the first mechanism, the mental simulation is effortless and quick. Thus, it 
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can easily be overruled by more cognitive processes. This leads to the prediction that 
rigid right-handers will especially show a preference for products with a handle oriented 
rightwards when mentally taxed. On the other hand, the simulation process of flexible 
right-handers seems more demanding, because it asks for a comparison of all possible 
actions with objects based on what the body and the product permit at the time of 
observation. Therefore, we hypothesize that if mental resources are limited and 
environmental cues cannot be taken into account, the motor fluency effect will not occur 
for flexible right-handers.  
H4:  Distraction increases rigid right handers‟ preference for products with a 
handle oriented rightwards but reduces flexible right handers‟ preference 
for products oriented rightwards, compared to products with a handle 
oriented leftwards.  
Overview of studies 
In four studies we investigate how handle orientations affect right-handers‟ 
evaluation of products. In the first study we focus on the main effect of motor fluency 
(hypothesis 1). In Study 2, we examine to what extent flexible and rigid right-handers 
pay attention to orientation cues (hypothesis 2). In Study 3, we test if left- and right-
handed actions have a different impact on preference construction by flexible and rigid 
right-handers (hypothesis 3). Finally, Studies 3 and 4 focus on the effect of degree of 
right-handedness and distraction (hypothesis 4 and 5) on preferences for easy-to-grasp 
products.  
STUDY 1 
Study 1 aims to establish the motor fluency effect. We hypothesize that the 
orientation of product handles has an impact on choice. We go beyond Ping et al.‟s 
findings (2009) by creating a choice task in which participants choose between objects of 
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the same product category. We predict that when right-handers are given the choice 
between a product oriented with its handle leftwards and one oriented rightwards, 
products with rightward handles will be preferred over products with leftward handles. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 28 university students (17 male) between 17 and 
31 years old (M = 20.72, SD = 2.81). All students were recruited from an online subject 
pool and participated to receive partial course credit. Participants were prescreened to be 
right-handers. Handedness was determined by the hand with which a person writes 
(Perelle & Ehrman, 2009). 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually and were unobtrusively 
videotaped during the session. They sat behind a table, with a shopping basket on the 
chair at their right side. Each trial started with a screen that was put on the table by the 
experimenter in order to prevent participants from viewing the placement of products. 
Next, the experimenter put two similar products (e.g., two pizza cutters) on the table in 
one of the four possible configurations (see Figure 1.1). Participants were asked to choose 
as quickly as possible, once the screen was taken away, which of both products they 
would prefer to use. They indicated their choice by grasping the product they preferred 
with their right hand and put it in the shopping basket. The experimenter registered 
their choice and installed the screen for the next trial. At the end of the session, 
participants were asked to write down all their decision rules for making choices and to 
guess the purpose of the study. The videotapes were used afterwards for double checking 
the coding of choices. 
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Figure 1.1. Four possible configurations of easy- and difficult-to-grasp 
products. A and B represent target trials in which a conflict in ease of 
grasping is induced, whereas C and D are filler trials. 
 
Materials. Each participant saw 32 pairs of products (see Appendix). All pairs of 
products were utensils for cooking (e.g., measuring cups), gardening (e.g., spades), 
hygiene (e.g., toothbrushes) and other home purposes. In 16 target trials, product pairs 
were shown with the handle of both products pointing in opposite directions. One 
product was oriented with its handle towards the right (i.e., an angle of 135°) , whereas 
the other product was presented with its handle towards the left (i.e., an angle of -135°). 
Products with handles oriented rightwards (vs. leftwards) are easy-to-grasp with the 
right (vs. left) hand. In half of all target trials the product oriented rightwards was shown 
on the right side of the table (See A in Figure 1.1) and in the other half on the left side (B, 
in Figure 1.1) (counterbalanced across participants). In eight filler trials, participants had 
to choose between two products without handles (e.g., two vases). In the other eight filler 
trials, product pairs were shown with both handles in the same direction (i.e., four times 
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rightwards, and four times leftwards, see C and B in Figure 1.1). The order of trials was 
counterbalanced over participants.  
Results and discussion 
For each participant, we created a percentage score indicating, for the 16 target 
trials, how often participants had chosen the easy-to-grasp product (i.e., the product 
oriented rightwards). Participants mentioned aspects like color and design for their 
evaluation, but none of them brought up product orientation (similar in all studies). One 
participant guessed the purpose of the study and was removed from further analyses. 
One outlying observation was removed, because it lay outside of the interquartile range 
(Tukey, 1977). However, analyses led to similar results if the outlier or suspicious 
participant were included. In all studies of this paper, we conducted a similar outlier 
analysis that we only report when outliers were detected. Overall, participants preferred 
easy-to-grasp products over difficult-to-grasp products (M = 57.25%, SE = 2.21%) which 
differs significantly from a random choice pattern (t(25) = 3.28, p = .003). These 
findings show that right-handers prefer easy-to-grasp products to difficult-to-grasp 
products. These results thus replicate the study by Ping et al. (2009), in which 
participants were asked to actively pick up the product they preferred. One could argue 
that the act of grasping itself played a pivotal role in these findings. Studies 3 and 4 are 
designed as online environments to test if the motor fluency effect occurs without the 
need to grasp products. First, in Study 2, we test how flexible and rigid right-handers 
differ in how they process information about orientation cues. 
STUDY 2 
In this study we examine if right-handers differ in the extent to which they pay 
attention to situational constraints. By definition, the more one is strongly right-handed, 
the more one manipulates objects exclusively with the right hand. Rigid right-handers 
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are less flexible in switching hands while interacting with their environment and 
manipulate objects with the dominant right hand, while more flexible right-handers are 
sensitive to situational constraints when choosing which hand to use (Gonzalez & 
Goodale, 2009). In this study we seek to find more evidence for the proposition that 
flexible right-handers pay more attention to orientation cues than rigid right-handers. 
We predict that, after being exposed to different products with handles, flexible right-
handers will recall the orientation of product handles better than rigid right-handers. 
Degree of handedness can be measured by means of performance measures (e.g., peg 
moving, Annett, 1976; (precision) grasping, Bryden, et al., 2000; grip strength, Gonzalez 
& Goodale, 2009) or hand preference questionnaires (e.g., Oldfield, 1971). For right-
handers these measures are highly correlated (Brown, Roy, Rohr, & Bryden, 2006). 
Here, degree of handedness is measured by a hand preference questionnaire about the 
products presented in the study. 
Method 
Participants. In return for monetary compensation 60 university students (26 
male) were recruited from a subject pool to participate in this study and several other 
unrelated studies. All participants were between 19 and 32 years old (M = 21.93, SD = 
2.04) and prescreened to be right-handers (see Study 1).  
Procedure. Participants watched a presentation of 24 products on a computer 
screen and were told that questions about the products would follow afterwards. Twelve 
target products had a handle oriented rightwards (i.e., six products with an angle of 
135°) or leftwards (i.e., six products with an angle of -135°) and 12 filler products had no 
handle. The presentation of target and filler products was randomized, with the 
restriction that target and filler trials were alternated and no more than three subsequent 
target trials had a similar handle orientation. Handle orientation of products was 
randomized across participants. Subsequently, participants performed a cued recall task 
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in which they were asked to reproduce the orientation of the handle of the target 
products (i.e., a binary choice, leftwards or rightwards) and to indicate their certainty for 
each answer on a 6-point scale (from 50% = not certain at all, just guessing to 100% = 
absolutely certain). Finally, participants reported on a 5-point scale (1 = always with my 
left hand and 5 = always with my right hand) which hand they would use for 
manipulating the 12 target products presented in the first phase.  
Results and discussion 
To create an overall performance measure for each participant, orientation 
answers of all 12 target products were coded for correctness (i.e., 0 is incorrect, 1 is 
correct), multiplied by their level of certainty and aggregated. Degree of right-
handedness1 resulted from aggregating the handedness scores of the target products 
(Cronbach‟s  = .81). Two participants indicated in the debriefing that during exposure 
to the products, they explicitly tried to memorize the orientation of the handles. These 
observations were excluded from further analyses but did not affect statistical results. 
We found a significant negative correlation between participants‟ degree of right-
handedness and performance (r = -.34, p = .01; without correction for uncertainty: r = -
.26, p < .05). Both left (r = -.29, p = .03) and right orientations of handles (r = -.28, p = 
.04) accounted for this result. This indicates that flexible right-handers perform better 
on the task and hence seem to pay more attention to orientation cues in their 
environment than rigid right-handers.  
STUDY 3 
In Study 2 we demonstrated that flexible right-handers paid more attention to 
orientation cues. Hence, in this study we examine the processes behind motor fluency. 
                                                     
1 In all studies where degree of handedness was measured, participants scored between 3 and 5, 
indicating that all right-handers indeed showed a preference for manipulating objects with the 
right hand. 
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We measure degree of right-handedness and manipulate whether products are chosen 
with the right or left hand. We predict that flexible right-handers will rely on situational 
constraints and show a preference for products oriented rightwards when using the right 
hand, but a reversed preference for products oriented leftwards when using the left 
hand. For rigid right-handers, we predict a preference for products oriented rightwards, 
no matter the hand used. The design of this study is similar to Study 1, but we make use 
of a computerized task. Pictures of products are clearly not graspable, but nonetheless 
previous research has shown that mental simulation of grasping also occurs in response 
to images of products (Tucker & Ellis, 1998).  
Method 
Participants. In return for monetary compensation, 67 university students (16 
male) were recruited from a subject pool to participate in this study and several other 
unrelated studies. All participants were between 18 and 24 years old (M = 20.78, SD = 
1.49) and prescreened to be right-handers (see Study 1).  
Procedure and materials. Participants sat in partially enclosed cubicles which 
prevented them from having contact with each other. They were shown pairs of similar 
products (i.e., utensils for cooking, hygiene, and other home purposes) on a computer 
screen. In each trial participants were asked to choose as quickly as possible which 
product they preferred to use. Participants were randomly assigned to using the left 
hand or right hand for making choices. They indicated their answer by tapping on the 
letter “D” on the keyboard if they preferred the product presented on the left side of the 
screen or tapping on “K” if they chose the product on the right side. The design of this 
study was similar to that of Study 1. In eight target trials, the handles of the two products 
pointed in opposite directions (i.e., products oriented rightwards in an angle of 100°, and 
products oriented leftwards in an angle of -100°). In half of these trials the product 
oriented rightwards was shown on the left side of the screen, whereas in the other half it 
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was shown on the right side. In four filler trials the handles of the products were oriented 
in the same direction (twice leftwards, and twice rightwards) and four other filler trials 
consisted of product pairs without handles. We randomized whether items of product 
pairs were presented on the left or right side of the screen, and order of trials within 
participants. All product pairs with handles were randomly selected to be target or filler 
trials. After the choice task, participants were asked to write down their thoughts when 
deciding which products to choose, and to guess what the study was about.  
Degree of right-handedness. Among other unrelated studies following the 
choice task, participants completed the handedness scale (for a discussion of this 
measure, see Curt, Mesbah, Lellouch, & Dellatolas, 1997) in which they reported on a 5-
point scale (1 = always with my left hand and 5 = always with my right hand) which 
hand they would use for manipulating 12 different objects (e.g., use a spoon, tennis 
racket).  
Results and discussion 
Two participants (i.e., one from each hand condition) correctly guessed the 
purpose of this study and were removed from further analyses. These removals did not 
affect statistical results. For each participant we created a percentage score indicating 
how often products oriented rightwards were chosen in the eight target trials. We 
conducted a GLM analysis on the percentage scores with hand used (left vs. right) and 
degree of right-handedness as independent between-subjects variables. A main effect of 
hand use emerged (F(1, 61) = 13.10, p = .0006) indicating that on average, participants 
who used the right hand chose products oriented rightwards more frequently (53%, SE = 
2%) than participants using the left hand to indicate choices (43%, SE = 3%). There was 
no main effect of degree of right-handedness (F < 1). Most important however was the 
significant interaction effect of hand used and degree of right-handedness (F(1, 61) = 
12.10, p = .0009) (see Figure 1.2). As expected, simple effects analyses, in which 
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estimated values were compared with a random choice pattern (i.e., 50%), revealed that 
flexible right-handers (Mright-handed - 1SD) who used the right hand for making choices had 
a preference for products oriented rightwards (61%, SE = 3%, t(64) = 3.15, p = .003), 
whereas flexible right-handers who used the left hand had a preference for products 
oriented leftwards (37%, SE = 5%, t(64) = -2.94, p = .005). This indicates that preference 
construction for flexible right-handers is affected by situational constraints. On the other 
hand, rigid right-handers (Mright-handed + 1SD) did not show a preference for products 
oriented rightwards (or leftwards), neither with the right hand (46%, SE = 3%, t(64) = -
1.16, p = .25) nor with the left hand (50%, SE = 4%, t(64) = .03, p = .97). Slopes analyses 
indicate that more flexible right-handers show stronger motor fluency effects than rigid 
right-handers, both with the left hand (β = -24, t(64) = -2.06, p = .04) as with the right 
hand (β = 27, t(64) = 3.03, p = .004). 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Percentage of products with a handle oriented rightwards 
chosen, as a function of degree of right-handedness and hand used to 
make choices.  
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, **** p < .0001. Significances between 
brackets indicate to what extent values differ from a random choice 
pattern (i.e., 50%). 
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The findings of Study 3 suggest that flexible right-handers are affected by the 
orientation of product handles in constructing preferences, whereas rigid right-handers 
are not. More specifically, we forced participants to indicate their choices with either the 
left or right hand and found that flexible right-handers preferred products oriented 
leftwards when using the left hand to indicate choices and vice versa for the right hand. 
This pattern of findings clearly indicates that flexible right-handers process orientation 
cues and match these cues with what the body permits at the time of decision making. 
We did not find evidence for the mechanism that rigid right-handers have a preference 
for products oriented rightwards. However as we stated in the introduction, it is possible 
that this process is easily overruled by more cognitive decision making rules. Therefore 
in Study 4, we test if distraction inhibits the occurrence of the motor fluency effect for 
flexible right-handers and enhances the effect for rigid right-handers.  
STUDY 4 
Study 4 has four major objectives. First, we seek to replicate the findings of Study 
3 for undistracted flexible and rigid right-handers. Second, we test the impact of 
distraction on the preference for easy-to-grasp products for flexible and rigid right-
handers. Third, participants are not asked to perform any grasping-like movements 
towards products or towards the keyboard while looking at products in order to 
demonstrate that our findings are not driven by explicit motor activations. Because 
motor behavior is by no means restricted in this study, we expect flexible right-handers 
to have a natural preference for products oriented rightwards. Finally, participants are 
asked to rate the attractiveness of one product, rather than to choose between product 
pairs, to test if the motor fluency effect is due to the observed conflict in ease of grasping 
or due to the inherent ease or difficulty-of-grasping of each individual product.  
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Method 
Participants. In return for partial course credit, 106 university students (64 
male) were recruited. All participants were between 18 and 23 years old (M = 19.25, SD = 
1.30) and prescreened to be right-handers (see Study 1). 
Procedure and materials. As in Study 3, participants sat in partially enclosed 
cubicles and all instructions were presented on a computer screen. Participants were told 
that they were about to see the image of a product as it would be used in an advertising 
campaign for the product, and answer some questions about the product afterwards. 
Then we informed them that they would have to memorize a number while observing the 
product to simulate a distracting real-life situation in which people encounter 
advertisements. We told them that people often think of other things when exposed to 
advertisements. Our manipulation of distraction has frequently been used in the 
literature (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995; Nowlis & Shiv, 2004; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 
1999). In the “low distraction” condition participants were requested to memorize the 2-
digit number „75‟. The other half of participants in the “high distraction” condition were 
asked to memorize the 9-digit number „753293142‟. Then the advertisement task started 
in which a designer water boiler was shown for 5 seconds. Half of all participants were 
shown the water boiler with its handle oriented rightwards (“easy-to-grasp condition”). 
The other half saw the boiler with its handle oriented leftwards (“difficult-to-grasp 
condition”). Following this presentation, participants were asked to indicate how 
attractive they considered the water boiler on a visual analogue scale ranging from not 
attractive at all to very attractive (200 points). Subsequently they were asked to report 
the number they had memorized. Finally, after several filler tasks, participants indicated 
which hand they would use for manipulating a water boiler on a 5-point scale (ranging 
from 1 = always with my left hand to 5 = always with my right hand). 
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Results and discussion 
Six participants (all from the high distraction condition) could not recall the 
correct digit at the end of the study and were discarded from further analysis. Distraction 
(low vs. high) and ease of grasping (easy vs. difficult) were entered as discrete between-
subject variables in a general linear model (GLM) analysis, and degree of right-
handedness was entered as a continuous between-subject variable. A marginally 
significant main effect of degree of right-handedness demonstrates that flexible right-
handers gave higher ratings of attractiveness than rigid right-handers (β = -7.40, F(1, 92) 
= 3.67, p = .059). The two-way interactions of Ease of grasping x Distraction (F(1, 92) = 
4.94, p = .03) and Degree of right-handedness x Distraction (F(1, 92) = 7.28, p = .008) 
were significant. However, all of these findings were qualified by a significant three-way-
interaction among ease of grasping, distraction and degree of right-handedness (F(1, 92) 
= 5.79, p = .02) (see Figure 1.3). All other effects were insignificant (ps > .18). To 
interpret the three-way-interaction, analyses were performed separately for low and high 
distraction conditions. We found a significant two-way-interaction between ease of 
grasping and degree of right-handedness for the low distraction condition (F(1,48) = 
4.26, p = .04) whereas this interaction was not significant for the high distraction 
condition (p > .17). 
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Figure 1.3. Attractiveness of a water boiler as a function of distraction, 
ease of grasping and degree of right-handedness in Study 4.  
Note. Standard errors are represented in the figure by the error bars 
attached to each column. 
 
Analyses of simple slopes reveal that the easy-to-grasp boiler was rated more 
attractive by undistracted flexible right-handers than by undistracted rigid right-handers 
(β = -28.47, t(99) = -3.44, p = .001), whereas the difficult-to-grasp boiler was rated 
equally attractive by undistracted flexible and rigid right-handers (β = -7.19, t(99) = -
1.17, p = .25). Simple effects analyses show that undistracted flexible right-handers 
tended to find the easy-to-grasp boiler more attractive ( Yˆ  = 132, SE = 9.24) than the 
difficult-to-grasp boiler ( Yˆ  = 111, SE = 7.59, t(99) = -1.74, p = .08), whereas undistracted 
rigid right-handers found the easy- ( Yˆ  = 86, SE = 10.29) and difficult-to-grasp boiler ( Yˆ  
= 100, SE = 7.92) equally attractive (t(99) = 1.08, p = .28). These findings indicate that, 
in the low distraction condition, we replicated the effect from Study 3 that flexible right-
handers show a higher preference for an easy-to-grasp product than rigid right-handers. 
Note that in the low distraction condition, only the attractiveness rating of the 
easy-to-grasp boiler by the flexible right-handers was significantly different from the 
neutral point (i.e., 100) on the scale ( Yˆ = 132, t(99) = 3.50, p < .001, all other ps > .12). 
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Thus the findings suggest that the effect is driven by an increase in attractiveness of the 
easy-to-grasp product rather than by a decrease in attractiveness of the difficult-to-grasp 
product. 
Further contrast analyses revealed that distraction indeed suppressed the motor 
fluency effect for flexible right-handers. As predicted, we found that undistracted flexible 
right-handers tended to judge the easy-to-grasp boiler as more attractive ( Yˆ  = 132) than 
distracted flexible right-handers ( Yˆ  = 108, SE = 8.9, t(99) = -1.87, p = .07). Distracted 
flexible right-handers in the easy-to-grasp condition ( Yˆ = 108, SE = 9.34) and difficult-
to-grasp condition ( Yˆ = 108, SE = 8.90) did not differ in their attractiveness rating (t(99) 
= 0, p = .997). 
As expected, it was revealed that highly distracted rigid right-handers rated the 
easy-to-grasp boiler as more attractive ( Yˆ = 126, SE = 7.82) than the difficult-to-grasp 
boiler ( Yˆ = 100, SE = 9.35), t(99) = 2.14, p = .04. Distracted rigid right-handers found 
the easy-to-grasp boiler more attractive ( Yˆ = 126, SE = 7.82) than did undistracted rigid 
right-handers ( Yˆ  = 86, SE = 10.29, t(99) = 3.11, p = .003). This seems to suggest that the 
automatic body-driven action tendency is boosted when rigid right-handers are 
distracted.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Many products have handles and need to be placed on store shelves or pictured 
on websites in some way or another. However it remained an open question as to how or 
whether this orientation cue impacts product evaluations of right-handers. In three 
experiments we find evidence for the existence of the motor fluency effect both when 
viewing physical products (Study 1) as in an online shopping contexts (Study 3 and 4). 
Grasping movements are not a prerequisite to find fluency effects (as addressed in Study 
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4), which makes these findings important for practitioners in diverse domains like 
advertising and online shopping. We replicate Ping et al.‟s finding (2009) that right-
handers prefer easy-to-grasp products, even when choosing between products within one 
category that can be compared on the basis of many other characteristics than 
orientation of handles. Most interestingly, however, our results carry evidence for two 
different routes to the motor fluency effect. First of all, we demonstrate that body 
feedback about biomechanical efficiency can create an experience of fluency and affect 
preference construction. We show that flexible right-handers pay more attention to 
situational constraints (Study 2) and as a consequence mainly these individuals show a 
preference for easy-to-grasp products (Study 3 and 4). When motor behavior is 
restricted to one side of the body, flexible right-handers prefer products of which the 
handle is oriented in the direction of the hand that is triggered to interact (Study 3). 
Additionally, when flexible right-handers are distracted from environmental cues, the 
effect is attenuated (Study 4). At first sight, we found less evidence for the automatic 
bodily driven mechanism of motor fluency. Based on Ping et al.‟s (2009) intuitive 
explanation for the motor fluency effect, one might expect that rigid right-handers would 
have a strong preference for products oriented rightwards. However, we suggest that 
rigid right-handers employ fewer mental resources on deciding which hand to use to 
interact with the world than do flexible right-handers. Therefore, rigid right-handers‟ 
bodily sensations might easily be overruled by more deliberate processes. In support of 
this interpretation, only when rigid right-handers were distracted (Study 4), they were 
susceptible to motor fluency. Thus, our findings seem to suggest that preference 
construction can be automatically influenced by bodily actions, but that more deliberate 
processes often overrule the influence of automatic motor simulations. Future research 
could investigate which decision cues rigid right-handers rely on when undistracted, as 
this was outside the scope of the present research.  
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In Study 4 we demonstrate that the effect is driven by the increased liking of easy-
to-grasp products, both for flexible and rigid right-handers, rather than by decreased 
liking of difficult-to-grasp products. This finding reinforces and extends the literature 
that shows that processing fluency is affectively positive (Reber, et al., 1998; Winkielman 
& Cacioppo, 2001).  
We believe that our results are driven by ease of processing information (as 
induced by differences in ease of grasping), rather than by explicit imagery of product 
usage experiences. We cannot rule out that people consciously imagined performing 
actions with the products, but we did not explicitly ask them to do so and overall people 
made quick decisions. What speaks to our reasoning is that recent research showed that 
explicit motor imagery activated different motor regions in the brain than mental 
simulations of actions when reading action verbs (Willems, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 
2010). Hence the impact of ease of grasping may be qualitatively different from the 
impact of (ease of) imagery. Imagery implies a more demanding cognitive strategy that 
could even reduce the unconscious effect of fluency of grasping. Further research could 
distinguish between effects of implicit mental simulations and explicit imagery. 
Fluency effects are most pronounced when people make quick intuitive decisions. 
Future research could explore whether people prefer difficult-to-grasp products when 
they have to motivate their choices. Recently, it has been suggested that stimuli that are 
difficult to process seem more interesting and attractive (Labroo & Kim, 2009). When it 
is truly effortful to process information about a product, people may infer from their 
efforts that it must be really important to have it.  
In this research we focus on right-handers and do not wish to claim that our 
findings will be mirrored for left-handers. Research has highlighted that left-handers are 
less lateralized and more ambidextrous than right-handers (Bryden, et al., 2000; 
Gonzalez, et al., 2007; Gurd, Schulz, Cherkas, & Ebers, 2006). In addition it is possible 
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that some left-handers adapt to a world predominantly organized for right-handers 
(Oldfield, 1971). All together these arguments suggest that left-handers may react 
qualitatively different than right-handers to their environment. 
Wide areas of research in cognitive and social psychology, consumer behavior and 
neuroscience have now found evidence that our body has an impact on higher order 
cognition, in domains such as language (Glenberg, 1997) and emotion processing 
(Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001; Niedenthal, et al., 2009), action 
understanding (Tucker & Ellis, 1998), self-regulation (Hung & Labroo, 2011) and trust 
(IJzerman & Semin, 2009; Williams & Bargh, 2008). The present work about product 
preferences is in line with theories about embodiment by showing that consumers‟ 
(simulated) physical interactions with products have an impact on decision making 
processes. Not only do our findings indicate that information processing is embodied, 
such that actions can impact preference construction, we also go beyond this main 
embodiment effect and demonstrate that it is flexible and situated. Ease of grasping 
affects preference construction, but mainly for flexible right-handers who take into 
account situational constraints when interacting with the world. Our research thus 
highlights the notion that embodiment is context-dependent and suggests that 
researchers should not only show that embodiment effects exist, but also understand 
when they occur (Niedenthal, et al., 2010). 
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APPENDIX 
Study 1 
Target trials. Basting brushes, butter knifes, cleaning brushes, forks, 
hairbrushes, ice cream scoops, ladles, pizza cutters, potato mashers, razors, spades, 
spatulas, spoons, toothbrushes, vegetable peelers, whisks. 
Filler trials with orientation. Bottle openers, combs, cooking tongs, cutters, 
graters, measuring cups, paintbrushes, sieves. 
Filler trials without orientation. Alarm clocks, candles, boxes of 
dishwashing tablets, tubes of hand cream, jars, pencil sharpeners, rolls of toilet paper, 
vases. 
Study 2 and Study 3 
In Study 2, only one object was presented, whereas in Study 3 pairs of objects 
were presented. Trials with orientation were target trials in Study 2, and used for target 
and filler trials in Study 3. 
Trials with orientation. Cleaning brush, flash light, gardening fork, ice cream 
scoop, mug, pan, pasta fork, sieve, water boiler, water jug, whisk, wrench.  
Filler trials without orientation. Used in both studies: bottle of wine, 
hairspray, pillow, potato chips. Used in pilot study: box of cereals, clocks, box of 
dishwashing tablets, glass, hat, lamp, nailbrush, vase. 
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ESSAY 2 
Doing Things Differently Instigates  
Openness to New Consumption Experiences 
2.  
 
ABSTRACT 
Interrupting routines can have dramatic effects on consumers‟ mindsets. When 
disrupted from the routine of the daily grind, people prefer more unique consumption 
experiences. Performing unusual actions, like left-handed actions by right-handers or 
using a new technology for the first time, increases the preference for scarce products 
and uncommon holiday destinations, and the willingness to try out new products. We 
show that explorative consumer behavior is triggered by heightened arousal as induced 
by novel actions. When people are aware of the unusual situation, the effect disappears. 
Alternative explanations driven by difficulty, mood regulation, increased self-awareness, 
and lower self-confidence are discussed and ruled out. 
Keywords: need for uniqueness, openness to experience, curiosity, exploration, 
novelty, product innovation 
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INTRODUCTION 
People are creatures of habit. They don‟t like change and often stick to the 
behavioral patterns they are used to. Regular activities, like routine trips to the store, are 
performed almost mechanically. But what happens if consumers‟ daily grind is 
disrupted? What if people find themselves in an unexpected novel situation, like, for 
example, when entering a store and receiving a welcome gift, or when using a newly 
introduced type of shopping cart? How would this affect subsequent behavior? The 
current research suggests that doing something unfamiliar can activate the drive to stand 
out from the cloud, to strive for uniqueness and new experiences.  
Recent research on consumer mindsets by Wood (2010) found that people who 
experienced life changes were more likely to be attracted to new or unfamiliar options in 
terms of food and other product domains, whereas a lay theory perspective would predict 
that in times of change people choose their favorite food options to comfort themselves. 
Wood has suggested that consumers avoid old favorites in new, shifting and uncertain 
environments due to an “openness to change” mindset. Contrary to experiencing large 
changes in life, consumers frequently find themselves in unexpected situations. Hence 
we seek to find out if subtle novel environmental cues, just like life changes, can cause an 
increased openness to change in consumer mindsets. It has been shown that novelty is 
arousing and leads to curiosity and exploration (Berlyne, 1950). Therefore, we suggest 
that novel environmental cues are arousing and trigger not just openness to change, but 
openness to new consumption experiences. 
Marketers would do anything to have consumers being open to new experiences 
and choose their new products or services. Amongst other strategies, they may highlight 
the newness of a product regarding its package, offer free trial periods, a temporary price 
reduction, or present a limited special edition of the product. Consumers who are no 
doubt easily tempted by new products are people who want to feel unique and special. 
  
 
39 
When people want to feel unique, they can differentiate themselves from others by the 
products they buy (Tian, et al., 2001). In order to convey uniqueness, people break rules 
and conventionalities and explore the marketplace: Uniqueness seekers search for 
variety in their product choices and prefer novel, scarce or unfamiliar products 
(McAlister & Pessemier, 1982). Because we propose that unusual situations trigger 
openness to new experiences, and because explorative consumption is central to the 
mindset of consumers who want to feel unique, we suggest that unusual situations will 
boost need for uniqueness.  
In four studies, we examine how subtle situational changes impact consumers‟ 
mindsets and subsequent product evaluations. We demonstrate that merely performing 
a task differently than one is used to increases one‟s need for uniqueness. We also show 
that the impact of an unusual action boosts unique product choices by low uniqueness 
seekers to the level of high uniqueness seekers. When people‟s attention is drawn to the 
unusualness of their actions, the effect disappears. Finally we illustrate that uniqueness 
seekers are more open to new experiences, and that unusual actions increase arousal 
which in its turn triggers explorative behavior. 
Our research adds to the existing literature about consumers‟ mindsets (Dhar, 
Huber, & Khan, 2007; Lee & Ariely, 2006; Wood, 2010) by suggesting that novelty and 
arousal can instill an explorative mindset. It may be of relevance to marketers to 
understand how novelty can render openness to new experiences and make consumers 
eager to try out new or unknown products. In what follows we develop the theoretical 
background and our hypotheses, before turning to our studies. 
Environmental changes, arousal and exploration 
A first insight into how environmental changes can trigger exploration is found in 
research about habits. The majority of people‟s actions are routine. Research about 
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habitual behavior shows that people with strong habits do not easily detect changes in 
the environment, search less extensively for information about alternative actions or the 
context itself and follow simple, shallow decision rules (Fazio, Ledbetter, & Towles-
Schwen, 2000; Verplanken, et al., 1997; Verplanken & Wood, 2006). Interestingly 
however, habits can be changed by disrupting the environmental cues with which the 
habits are associated (Wood, et al., 2005). If novel experiences disrupt the habitual 
pattern of actions, then people‟s attention is drawn to new information and alternative 
actions are considered. Whereas research about habits suggests that subtle unusual 
experiences may disrupt habitual thinking and lead to heightened attention to change, 
research about curiosity suggests more specifically that unusualness may lead to 
explorative behavior.  
Novelty, just like complexity and surprise, increases arousal, curiosity and 
exploration (Berlyne, 1950, 1960). Consider an in-store demonstration of a new food 
item that is freshly prepared on site by a demonstrator who distributes the samples for 
tasting. People feel attracted to the unknown, they are curious about the new product. 
Berlyne (1960) called this phenomenon perceptual curiosity, or the drive that is aroused 
by novel stimuli (as opposed to epistemic curiosity, or the desire for knowledge) (for a 
review, see Loewenstein, 1994). For example, when rats were familiarized with three 
cubes (or rings) for 5 minutes, and one of the cubes (rings) was then replaced by a ring 
(cube), it was found that they sniffed more and longer at the novel or odd shape 
(Berlyne, 1950). Similarly, people look longer at novel visual shapes (Berlyne, 1960). 
Smith, Malmo and Shagass (1954) showed by means of a psychophysiological measure 
that curiosity is associated with an increase in arousal. When people listened to a story of 
which some parts were made incomprehensible, arm muscles were tenser during 
inaudible parts of speech. Here, we argue that unusual actions are novel stimuli that are 
arousing and make people curious, and hence more open to new experiences. We 
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propose that in comparison with doing a task like one always does, performing an 
unfamiliar task way will increase exploration.  
H1: Performing an unfamiliar action increases explorative consumption. 
Need for uniqueness 
We believe that performing an unfamiliar action will not just trigger openness to 
change among known products, but will be especially likely to create openness to new 
experiences, like an increased interest in uncommon or more unique products. This 
interest is typical for individuals who want to feel unique and special. Need for 
uniqueness is an important social dimension that stretches between the need to stand 
out of the crowd, and the need to belong to a group (Snyder & Fromkin, 1977). Being 
distinct can contribute to self-identity and self-esteem, but at the same time people do 
not want to be rejected by the social group they affiliate with. Therefore people search for 
optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991). Although uniqueness seeking is considered as a 
stable personality trait (Lynn & Snyder, 2002; Snyder & Fromkin, 1977; Tian, et al., 
2001), situational influences can change people‟s focus on the need to feel unique or 
similar to others. Levels of uniqueness seeking can be altered by e.g., providing bogus 
personality feedback (Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993; Markus & Kunda, 1986) or by 
presenting unique combinations of visual shapes (Maimaran & Wheeler, 2008).  
Uniqueness seekers are constantly searching for ways to express their unique 
personality. Social identity forms a way to express one‟s distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991), 
but also choice is a means to self-expression (but see, Kim & Markus, 1999, p. for 
cultural differences in valuing choice). Research has demonstrated that people seek 
variety and deviate from their favorite options in order to be seen as interesting (Ariely & 
Levav, 2000; Ratner & Kahn, 2002). People can strive for uniqueness through their 
consumption patterns (Lynn & Harris, 1997; Tian, et al., 2001), as the possessions they 
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own contribute to their identity (Belk, 1988). For instance, research has shown that 
higher levels of need for uniqueness are related to a stronger desire for scarce 
experiences (Fromkin, 1970), and higher levels of consumer innovativeness (Lynn & 
Harris, 1997).  
Because we propose that performing an unfamiliar action increases exploration, 
and because explorative consumption is fundamental to a mindset of uniqueness 
seeking, we suggest that deviations from common experience can increase uniqueness 
seeking and make people choose more unique products. If performing an unusual action 
heightens need for uniqueness, this would again strengthen our reasoning that unusual 
actions trigger explorative behavior. 
H2: Performing an unfamiliar action triggers a need to be unique and makes 
people choose more unique products. 
Incidental situational influences 
Often people are not aware of the subtle cues that affect decision making 
processes. Schwarz (2006b) emphasized that cognitions take place in daily life, in 
continuous interaction with the world. Hence, context sensitivity may be adaptive 
because it can alert people to existing opportunities or by interrupting processes when 
needed. However the flip side of the coin is that sometimes great value is given to 
incidental irrelevant bodily cues and feelings when making decisions. Attribution theory 
suggests that people attribute events to internal dispositions (e.g., abilities, or motives) 
or to aspects of the external situation (e.g., task difficulty, time pressure) (Ross, 1977). 
People often show the tendency to underestimate the impact of situational factors and 
overestimate the impact of internal dispositions (Heider, 1958). This makes judgments 
more vulnerable to the effect of incidental cues. For example, shaking the head, as when 
agreeing with something, while watching positively valenced products creates even 
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stronger positive evaluations of these products (Förster, 2004). Also, in a study by Darke 
and colleagues (2006), incidental affect influenced consumers‟ choices. More 
participants preferred an inferior CD player that played a happy song over a CD player 
with superior features playing a sad song, than when no music was played at all during 
product evaluation. Recent research by Van den Bergh and colleagues (in press) shows 
that not only incidental feelings, but also bodily actions can impact choices. In one of 
their studies, they showed that consumers who shop by carrying a shopping basket (i.e., 
approach orientation by arm flexion), bought more vice products (e.g., candy bars) at the 
cashier desk than consumers who shop by pushing a shopping cart (i.e., avoidance 
orientation by arm extension). However it has been shown that people are able to correct 
for the impact of incidental cues when they are aware of their irrelevance in judgments 
(Darke, et al., 2006; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). When participants were asked 
to rate how the music they heard while evaluating the CD players made them feel, the 
increased preference for a CD player with happy music disappeared (Darke, et al., 2006). 
Therefore we believe that making people aware that the novelty they experience is trivial, 
will eliminate its impact on judgments. Hence we predict that when people are aware of 
the unfamiliarity of action, they will not show explorative consumption. 
H3: When people‟s attention is drawn to the unfamiliarity of an action, 
explorative consumption disappears.  
Overview of studies 
In four studies we find evidence for these hypotheses. We show that performing 
an unfamiliar task boosts need for uniqueness (Study 1). Not only does it affect people‟s 
self-perceptions, it also affects behavior, as shown in Study 2 (choosing a scarce 
product), Study 3 (preferences deviating from a majority of consumers) and Study 4 
(trying out new products). In Study 3, we show that when people‟s attention is drawn to 
the unfamiliar task, the impact on preference for more unique products disappears. 
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Finally, in Study 4, we demonstrate that performing an unfamiliar task increases 
arousal, which in its turn boosts explorative consumption. In our studies we make use of 
two different unfamiliar, unusual tasks, namely performing a task with the non-
dominant hand (Study 1, 2 and 4) and making use of a new technological device to 
answer questions (Study 3). We test for alternative explanations based on perceived 
difficulty, heightened self-awareness, lowered self-confidence and mood regulation. 
STUDY 1 
In this study, we seek to find evidence for the hypothesis that performing an 
unfamiliar action boosts need for uniqueness. After an unusual or usual task, 
participants were asked to fill in the consumers‟ need for uniqueness scale, as developed 
by Tian et al. (2001). We expected participants who performed an unusual task to have a 
higher need to be unique. Higher levels of uniqueness seeking make people more likely 
to be creative, unconventional and dissimilar from others in buying products and 
combining possessions. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 71 students (18 men) between 18 and 24 years 
old (M = 20.71, SD = 1.52), from a large Western European university. All students were 
recruited from an online subject pool and participated for monetary compensation. 
Participants were prescreened to be right-handers (i.e., writing with the right hand). 
Procedure. Participants were seated in partly enclosed cubicles in front of a 
computer. Participants started with a choice task in which we induced an unusual 
feeling. They were shown pictures of 24 product pairs and asked to choose which of both 
they preferred. Each product pair consisted of two instances from the same product 
category (e.g., lamps, potato chips, pillows). In the “unusual” condition, participants 
were asked to put their left hand on the keyboard and indicate their choice by tapping on 
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“D” for the product on the left side of the screen and tapping on “K” for the product on 
the right side. In the “usual” condition, participants received the same instructions but 
were asked to use their right hand for indicating preferences. This task was followed by 
several unrelated filler tasks. Then participants completed the consumers‟ need for 
uniqueness scale (Tian, et al., 2001) on a 5-point Likert scale and were debriefed. 
Results and discussion 
The debriefing indicated that two participants were suspicious about the hand 
manipulation. These observations were removed for statistical analyses2. A one-tailed t-
test with hand used as the independent variable and need for uniqueness (Cronbach‟s  
= .94) as the dependent variable was significant (t(67) = 1.88, p = .03). Participants who 
used their left hand scored higher on need for uniqueness (M = 2.66) than participants 
who used their right hand during the choice task (M = 2.39). The finding of this study 
suggests that a subtle unusual action triggers a higher need for uniqueness. It should be 
noted that the consumers‟ need for uniqueness scale has been developed to measure 
people‟s stable trait of uniqueness. Nevertheless it seems that we were able to affect 
people‟s self-perceptions by means of our hand manipulation.  
STUDY 2 
If unusual actions induce a higher need for uniqueness, then people may want to 
express their uniqueness through the choices they make. Whereas Study 1 demonstrated 
that a subtle manipulation of unusualness had an impact on people‟s self-perceptions of 
uniqueness seeking, in this study we aim to find more evidence that such a manipulation 
can affect behavior.  
                                                     
2 We demonstrate in Study 3 that drawing attention to an unusual situation, makes the effect 
disappear. Here, the pattern of results was attenuated, but still significant when suspicious 
participants were removed (t(69) = 1.70, p = .05).  
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One way for consumers to express their need for uniqueness is by buying scarce 
products (Lynn & Harris, 1997), since they are uncommon and cannot be adopted by a 
majority of consumers. In this study we made participants choose between different 
boxes of chocolates of which one was labeled as “limited edition”. We predict that 
participants who perform an unusual task will pick the scarce or uncommon box of 
chocolates more frequently than participants who perform a usual (i.e., normal, 
frequently-performed) task. Moreover we expect this effect to be moderated by initial 
feelings of uniqueness, as consumers who have a chronic need for expressing their 
uniqueness will always feel tempted by scarce products.  
An alternative explanation for our findings in Study 1 is that left-handed actions 
are more difficult for right-handers than right-handed actions which could turn people‟s 
focus on themselves. If people become self-aware, they act even stronger in line with 
their self-perceptions (Goukens, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2009). Therefore, one would predict 
an opposite pattern of findings. According to this alternative explanation, high 
uniqueness seekers who perform an unfamiliar task would then have an increased need 
for uniqueness, whereas low uniqueness seekers would show an increased need to make 
conservative choices.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 99 students (59 male) between 18 and 23 years 
old (M = 19.30, SD = 1.31), from a large Western European university. All students were 
recruited from an online subject pool and participated for partial course credit. 
Participants were prescreened to be right-handers (i.e., writing with the right hand). 
Procedure. Participants were seated in partly enclosed cubicles in front of a 
computer. They started by completing the consumers‟ need for uniqueness scale (Tian, et 
al., 2001). Next, they performed several unrelated filler tasks that took approximately 30 
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minutes to complete. Then, they took part in an estimation task that we used to induce a 
subtle unusual feeling. On top of the screen several black squares of different sizes were 
presented simultaneously. One black target square was presented in the middle of the 
screen. Participants were asked to estimate the average size of the squares presented on 
top by increasing (up arrow) or decreasing (down arrow) the size of the target square. In 
the “unusual” condition, participants were asked to put their left hand on the arrows of 
the keyboard, whereas in the “usual” condition, participants were asked to use their right 
hand. Estimation times in all ten trials were fixed to five seconds. Following this 
manipulation, all participants read a scenario on paper in which they were to choose a 
box of chocolates. They were told that friends invited them for dinner and that they 
would bring a box of chocolates as a gift. All four boxes that participants could choose 
from were given a name (i.e., Mephisto, Adelson, Sapho, and Horta), carried identical 
sales prices, and contained 20 milk chocolates. For each box, we showed a picture of a 
piece of chocolate together with a short description of the characteristic ingredients. The 
Mephisto box was labeled as a limited edition offer. After indicating their choice, 
participants filled in the situational self-awareness scale (SSAS, Govern & Marsch, 2001) 
on a 7-point scale (from 1 “totally don’t agree” to 7 “fully agree”). Next they indicated 
how difficult they felt the square estimation task was on a visual analogue scale ranging 
from “not difficult at all” to “very difficult” (200 points). Finally participants were 
thanked and debriefed. 
Results 
Unique choice. All items from the need for uniqueness scale were aggregated to 
form one score of uniqueness (NFU, Cronbach‟s = .93), with higher scores indicating a 
higher chronic NFU. Choices of chocolates were coded as 1 if participants chose the 
limited edition offer Mephisto, and 0 otherwise. In a logistic regression with choice (0 = 
not unique, 1 = unique) as a dependent variable, we included hand use (left vs. right) as a 
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discrete between-subjects variable and NFU as a continuous (standardized) between-
subjects variable. As predicted, the analysis yielded a significant two-way interaction 
(χ²(1, N = 99) = 4.16, p = .04).  
 
Figure 2.1. Probability to choose a scarce box of chocolates as a function 
of task unusualness and need for uniqueness.  
Note. * p < .05 
 
Slopes and simple effects analyses confirmed our hypotheses (Figure 2.1). First, 
NFU predicted the probability of choosing the unique product (β = .69, χ²(1, N = 99) = 
5.34, p = .02) for participants who did the usual task (i.e., right hand). Thus, the choice 
for a limited edition indeed seems to express uniqueness seeking. Performing an unusual 
task boosted low NFU participants (MNFU - 1SD) likelihood of choosing a limited edition 
offer from 15% (usual task) to 46% (χ²(1, N = 99) = 5.11, p = .02), whereas the likelihood 
of choosing the limited edition did not change for high NFU (MNFU + 1SD) participants 
(i.e., 46% in usual task vs. 38% in unusual task, χ²(1, N = 99) = .23, p = .63). In the 
unusual task, both low and high NFU participants were equally likely to choose a limited 
edition offer (i.e., 46% for low vs. 38% for high NFU, β = -.46, χ²(1, N = 99) = .25, p = 
.62). 
Task difficulty and self-focus. Performing the square estimation task with the 
left or right hand did not affect perceptions of difficulty (F(1, 98) = .02, p = .89) or 
situational self-awareness (Cronbach‟s  = .78, F(1, 98) = .32, p = .57). Also, perceptions 
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of difficulty were not correlated with situational self-awareness. Adding task difficulty 
and self-focus as covariates in the analysis did not change the pattern of results 
suggesting that these factors did not mediate the effect of the unusual task and NFU on 
unique choices. 
Discussion 
In Study 2 we found that in usual circumstances, people follow their chronic 
dispositions to seek or avoid uniqueness when choosing between common and scarce 
product alternatives. High uniqueness seekers were more likely to choose a scarce box of 
chocolates. However, an unusual action boosted the preference for an uncommon, scarce 
product for low NFU individuals, such that they chose a limited edition box of chocolates 
as a gift as frequently as high NFU individuals. The finding that only low NFU people 
were affected by the manipulation of unusualness is consistent with the idea that the 
need to feel unique is chronically active for high NFU people (Maimaran & Wheeler, 
2008).  
We did not find evidence for the alternative explanation that an unusual task 
increases self-awareness. Additionally, low uniqueness seekers showed an increased 
tendency for uniqueness after performing an unusual task rather than an increased 
tendency for common options. Gao, Wheeler and Shiv (2009) have demonstrated that 
unfamiliar actions can shake one‟s sense of self and lower one‟s self-confidence. For 
example, writing an essay with the non-dominant hand about one‟s health concerns or 
intelligence lowered self-confidence, and as a consequence participants tried to restore 
their self-image by choosing products that communicated intelligence and health. In 
Study 1 and 2 we made participants perform a task with the dominant (usual) or 
nondominant (unusual) hand. One could therefore argue that this manipulation lowered 
self-confidence like it did in Gao et al.‟s research. However our manipulation did not 
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make people think explicitly about themselves. Nevertheless, to overcome this possible 
alternative interpretation of our findings, we make use of a different task in Study 3.  
STUDY 3 
In this study it is our goal to generalize our findings and use another 
manipulation of task unusualness than in the two previous studies. In this study, we let 
people manipulate a cutting-edge multitouch computer screen with a computer mouse or 
by tactile stimulation. Afterwards, participants are asked to choose holiday destinations 
after being told which destinations a majority of peers had chosen. High uniqueness 
seekers are interested in unconventional products (Tian, et al., 2001). Hence we expect 
that participants who give their preferences using the touch screen (a novel experience 
compared to using a computer mouse) will make more unique travel choices. 
Furthermore we expect that this effect will be eliminated when participants are made 
aware of the unusual nature of the response format. Therefore, we compare an explicit 
and implicit unusual condition with a control, or usual, condition.  
Finally, our theoretical analysis suggests that touching a computer screen does 
not make people question themselves in general or make them dwell on their particular 
shortcomings. However we test if our manipulation affects perceived task difficulty and 
feelings of self-worth, in order to rule out this alternative explanation.  
Method 
Participants. Eighty students (32 male) between 17 and 30 years old (M = 
21.38, SD = 1.93) from a large Western European university participated in this research. 
All students were recruited from an online subject pool and participated for monetary 
compensation.  
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Procedure. Participants were seated in a partly enclosed cubicle. First they 
participated in a “landscape evaluation” task that we used to manipulate task 
unusualness. A large computer screen (i.e., DellTM SX2210T multitouch monitor) was 
placed in front of them. All instructions were provided in a leaflet. In 20 trials 
participants were asked to indicate which of two nature landscapes they liked most. After 
each pair of pictures disappeared from screen, participants clicked on a letter “A” (left 
side) or “B” (right side) that appeared on the screen to indicate their preference. In the 
“usual” condition, participants made use of a computer mouse to indicate which 
landscape they preferred. No explicit instructions about the computer mouse were given. 
In the “implicitly unusual” condition, participants were briefly explained how to use the 
touch screen with the following instructions: “You use the touch screen as you would 
otherwise use the computer mouse. Briefly touching the screen once is the same as one 
left mouse click.” In the “explicitly unusual” condition, we turned participants‟ attention 
to the unique experience of using a touch screen with these instructions:“This task is 
different than what you are used to in this lab. There is no computer mouse, since this 
monitor is a touch screen. You use the touch screen as you would otherwise use the 
computer mouse. Briefly touching the screen once is the same as one left mouse click.” 
Subsequently, participants in the explicitly unusual condition answered two questions on 
7-point Likert scales: „To what extent are you used to working with a computer that has 
a touch screen?‟ (from 1 = not at all to 7 = very strongly) and „Which type of control do 
you use most frequently?‟ (from 1 = I always use a computer mouse to 7 = I always use 
a touch screen). Following the landscapes task, participants filled in a poll about travel 
destinations. In this poll, participants could see that a majority of previous students had 
selected certain destinations. The extent of nonconformity (based on a measure by 
Griskevicius, Goldstein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006) served as our main 
dependent measure. We told participants that the poll was organized by a major travel 
agency. Participants were asked to select their favorite travel destination among two 
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options in the categories city trip, winter sports and exotic beach holiday. Participants 
were informed that over 100 students had already taken the poll. It was mentioned that 
79% chose New York to San Francisco (city trip), 72% chose France to Austria (winter 
sports) and 86% chose Tenerife to La Palma (exotic destination). Participants indicated 
their own choices on a 7-point scale ranging from Strong preference for A (i.e., 
destination chosen by majority of students) to Strong preference for B. Afterwards, in all 
conditions we measured state self-esteem (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001) and 
situational self-awareness (Govern & Marsch, 2001) on 7-point scales (from 1 “totally 
don’t agree” to 7 “fully agree”). Participants in the implicitly and explicitly unusual 
condition were asked to write down all the devices they owned which were equipped with 
touch screens. Finally all participants were asked to rate the difficulty of the landscapes 
task (7-point Likert scale from 1 = not difficult at all to 7 = very difficult). 
Results and discussion 
We conducted an ANOVA with task unusualness (3 levels: usual, implicitly 
unusual and explicitly unusual) as a discrete between-subjects variable, destination (3 
levels: city trip, winter sports, and exotic beach holiday) as a repeated within-subject 
variable, and nonconformity as the dependent measure. Destination was significant (F(2, 
154) = 3.81, p = .02) indicating that some popular destinations were stronger in eliciting 
preferences than others. Post-hoc paired t-tests made clear that the nonconformity to 
choose San Francisco over New York was smaller (M = 3.10, SD = 1.79) than for Austria 
over France (M = 3.83, SD = 2.02; t(79) = 2.48, p = .02) and for LaPalma over Tenerife 
(M = 3.63, SD = 1.25; t(79) = 2.21, p = .03). No differences emerged between Austria and 
LaPalma (t(79) = .75, p = .46). Most importantly however, task unusualnes was also 
significant (F(2, 77) = 3.55, p = .03). Since no interaction emerged (F(4, 154) = .98, p = 
.42), the effect of task usualness was similar for all destinations. In the implicitly unusual 
condition, participants preferred unique travel destinations more (M = 3.94, SD = .88) 
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than in the control condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.12, t(79) = 2.53, p = .01), and in the 
explicitly unusual condition (M = 3.38, SD = .96, t(79) = 2, p = .05). No differences 
emerged between the usual condition and the explicitly unusual condition (t(79) = .50, p 
= .62). See Figure 2.2 for a visualization. 
 
Figure 2.2. Extent of nonconformity as a function of task usualness and 
awareness.  
Note. * p < .05 
 
The conditions did not have a different impact on perceived difficulty, self-esteem 
or self-awareness (all ps > .18). Adding these factors in the analysis as covariates did not 
change the pattern of results described above, suggesting that they did not mediate the 
effect of task unusualness on nonconformity.  
We further explored whether the novelty of using a touch screen was driving the 
effect, by taking a closer look at the number of devices with a touch screen that 
participants owned. We created a dummy coded variable “habituation to touch screens” 
(0 = no habituation, participant owns no devices, N = 36; and 1 = habituation, 
participant owns devices, N = 16, max. number of owned devices = 2). We did not ask for 
this information in the control condition. None of the participants owned a computer 
with a multitouch monitor. An ANOVA on nonconformity with explicitness (implicitly 
special vs. explicitly special) and habituation as discrete between-subjects variables 
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revealed that the omnibus F-test was marginally significant (F(3, 50) = 2.55, p = .07). 
The difference between conditions was significant for non-habituated participants (p < 
.01), whereas the difference between conditions was insignificant for habituated 
participants (p > .89) (Figure 2.3). Only participants who truly experienced the touch 
screen manipulation as novel, and were not explicitly made aware of this, chose more 
unique travel destinations.  
 
Figure 2.3. Extent of nonconformity as a function of habituation to 
touch screen devices and explicitness. 
 
STUDY 4 
So far we have demonstrated that an unusual task boosts uniqueness seeking. 
Self-perceptions of need for uniqueness increased in Study 1, people were attracted more 
by a scarce, limited edition of chocolates in Study 2, and preferred unconventional 
holiday destinations in Study 3. When people were aware of the unusualness of the task, 
it did not impact behavior. Taken altogether, these findings seem to suggest that an 
unusual experience triggers a mindset of openness to new experiences. With a little 
imagination, the instances of uniqueness seeking that we have tested in Study 2 and 3 
could already be considered examples of interest in new experiences. To test our 
assumption that people who are high in need for uniqueness, are also more open to new 
experiences, we conducted a pilot study with 91 students (35 men, Mage = 21.31, SDage = 
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1.72) who completed the consumers‟ need for uniqueness scale (Tian, et al., 2001), 
followed by the openness to experience scale of the HEXACO personality inventory (Lee 
& Ashton, 2004). Need for uniqueness (Cronbach‟s  = .93) was moderately positively 
correlated with openness to experience (Cronbach‟s  = .81; r = .31, p = .003, see Table 1 
for correlations between subscales). More specifically we found that two dimensions of 
openness to experience were correlated with need for uniqueness, namely 
inquisitiveness (i.e., a tendency to seek information about, and experience with the 
natural and human world) and unconventionality (i.e., a tendency to accept the 
unusual). The two other dimensions, namely aesthetic appreciation (i.e., enjoyment of 
beauty in art and nature) and creativity (i.e., an inclination for original thought and 
artistic expression) were not associated with uniqueness seeking. Indeed, inquisitiveness 
and unconventionality seem to address best our concept of exploring new opportunities, 
which goes along with uniqueness seeking.  
 
Table 2.1. Correlations between subscales of Openness to Experience and Need for Uniqueness. 
 
 Need for Uniqueness 
 Creativity Counter-conformity Avoidance of Similarity 
Openness to Experience    
Aesthetic appreciation -.12 .14 .02 
Inquisitiveness .30** .21* .16 
Creativity -.06 .08 .003 
Unconventionality .12 .20† .40*** 
Note. †p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
 
Finally, in Study 4, we investigate more thoroughly whether an unfamiliar task 
instigates openness to new experiences. As curiosity has been shown to follow from 
novelty and arousal (Berlyne, 1960), in this study we investigate whether an unusual 
situation goes along with heightened arousal to eventually lead consumers to explore and 
try out new things. Demonstrating that our manipulation of inducing a new experience 
leads to an increase in arousal and explorative consumption would strengthen our claim 
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that environmental cues of change can activate openness to new experiences. We test 
this proposition in the domain of product innovations, once again linking exploration to 
uniqueness seeking, since high need for uniqueness seekers tend to be innovators (Lynn 
& Harris, 1997). Furthermore, if an unusual experience makes consumers more curious 
about newly launched products, this may have interesting practical implications for 
marketers. We expect that participants performing an unusual task will be more likely to 
try out new products than participants performing a usual task.  
So far, we have observed the effects of unusual experiences on novelty seeking 
without any parallel effect on perceived task difficulty, on self-awareness, or on self-
esteem. However, another possible alternative explanation is that an unusual task 
prompts negative affect because of disfluent information processing. Experiencing 
negative feelings, people may want to repair their mood and indulge themselves with a 
special treat (Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001). To confront affect regulation with 
the novelty-driven curiosity hypothesis, we measured three dimensions of emotions, 
namely status, level of arousal and valence (Morris, 1995). If mood regulation is driving 
the effect, the familiarity of the task should impact uniqueness seeking through valence. 
If novelty drives uniqueness seeking, we expect changes in arousal. We expect no 
differences in status. As we use the same hand manipulation as in Study 1 and 2, we test 
explicitly whether feelings of self-worth or self-confidence are altered by task 
unusualness. 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-two students (28 men) between 19 and 29 years old (M = 
21.35, SD = 1.80) from a large Western European university participated in this research. 
All students were recruited from an online subject pool and prescreened to be right-
handers. They participated for monetary compensation. Seven participants were 
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discarded from further analysis because they did not comply with the instructions for the 
usual (n = 3) or unusual (n = 4) task. 
Procedure. First participants took part in the product choice task that was used 
to manipulate task unusualness. For 20 product pairs, participants indicated their choice 
by means of their right (i.e., usual) or left (i.e. unusual) hand (see Study 1 for further 
details). Immediately following this manipulation, we measured participants‟ mood, 
status and arousal by administering the Self-Assessment Manikin (Morris, 1995), a 
pictorial scale with 5 graphic figures. Participants indicated on a visual analogue scale 
(100 points) which of the 5 figures corresponded to their instant emotional state. For the 
arousal dimension, the SAM figures ranged from relaxed, sluggish, and sleepy to wide-
eyed and excited. For the mood valence dimension, SAM figures ranged from smiling 
and happy to frowning and unhappy. For the status dimension, the figures ranged from 
tall to little. Additionally, we assessed participants‟ state self-esteem (Heatherton & 
Polivy, 1991) and state self-confidence (“At this moment I feel self-confident”) on 7-point 
scales (from 1 “totally don’t agree” to 7 “fully agree”). Next, all participants took part in 
an additional seemingly unrelated study about product launches. They were asked to 
express their interest in trying out four new products (i.e., a new taste of a leading brand 
of potato chips, a new fragrance from their favorite perfume, a new layout for Facebook, 
a 3D TV set) on a visual analogue scale (10 points) ranging from „No interest at all‟ to 
„Highly interested‟. Finally, we assessed situational self-awareness (Govern & Marsch, 
2001) on a 7-point scale (from 1 “totally don’t agree” to 7 “fully agree”) and perceived 
difficulty of the product choice task on a visual analogue scale (ranging from 1 “not 
difficult at all” to 10 “very difficult”).  
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Results 
For further analyses, we excluded one participant in the unusual condition who 
deviated considerably from others‟ reactions to the product launch task (based on the 
interquartile criterium for outliers, Tukey, 1977)3.  
Explorative consumption. First, we tested whether the hand manipulation 
affected explorative consumption. We performed an ANOVA on willingness to try out 
product launches with task unusualness (usual vs. unusual) as a between-subject 
variable and product type as a within-subject variable (perfume, potato chips, Facebook, 
and 3D TV set). As predicted we found that task unusualness affected exploration (F(1, 
62) = 4.88, p = .03). Participants who did the unusual task were more interested in 
trying out new products (M = 4.91, SD = 1.32) than participants in the usual task 
condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.94). The effect of product type was also significant (F(3, 
186) = 16.12, p < .0001), indicating that some products attracted more interest than 
others. Potato chips (Mchips = 6.09, SD = 2.25) were preferred over all other product 
launches (all p‟s < .001). TV (M3DTV = 4.45, SD = 3.14) and perfume (Mperfume = 4.39, SD 
= 2.96) did not differ (p = .89), but were both preferred over trying out Facebook 
(MFacebook = 2.94, SD = 2.81) (both p‟s < .01). However, we found no significant 
interaction between task unusualness and product type (F(3, 186) = .86, p = .46), 
indicating that the effect of task unusualness was identical across products.  
Arousal. To explore whether a usual task increases arousal, we conducted an 
ANOVA on arousal, as measured by the Self-Assesment Manikin, with task unusualness 
as an independent between-subject variable. We found that participants in the unusual 
task condition experienced higher levels of arousal (M = 46.97, SD = 16.88) than those in 
the usual condition (M = 31.65, SD = 18.85; F(1, 62) = 11.77, p = .001). We tested the 
indirect effect of task unusualness via arousal on exploration by means of a 
                                                     
3 We applied the same procedure in all studies, but only here did we find outlying observations. 
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bootstrapping procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The indirect effect (tested with 1000 
bootstraps) was estimated to be .29 (SE = .18) with a 95% confidence-interval of [.04-
.82], supporting the existence of the indirect effect and the role of arousal as a mediator. 
The direct effect of task usualness on exploration was reduced when arousal was added 
to the model (F(1, 61) = 1.92, p = .17). 
Valence. There was a marginally significant effect of task unususalness on mood 
(F(1, 62) = 2.87, p = .10). On average, participants felt rather happy when performing the 
product choice task, but in the usual task condition, participants felt slightly happier (M 
= 68.26, SD = 11.80) than in the unusual task condition (M = 62.15, SD = 16.49). 
However, the indirect effect (task unusualness  mood  exploration) was not reliable, 
yielding a value of .02 (SE = .08) with a 95% confidence-interval of [-.10-.28]. 
Furthermore, the direct effect of task usualness on exploration was not reduced when 
mood was added to the model (F(1, 61) = 4.40, p = .04), which indicates that mood did 
not mediate the effect of task unusualness on exploration. 
Status. No differences in status emerged between participants in the usual and 
unusual condition (F(1, 62) = 0.94, p = .34). 
Self-esteem, self-confidence, self-awareness and perceived task 
difficulty. Task unusualness did not affect situational self-esteem (Cronbach‟s  = .85; 
F(1, 62) = 1.24, p = .27), nor its subscale of performance self-esteem (Cronbach‟s  = .80; 
F(1, 62) = 1.74, p = .19). We found no differences between conditions in self-confidence 
(F(1, 62) = .31, p = .58), situational self-awareness (Cronbach‟s  = .86; F(1, 62) = .02, p 
= .88) or perceived task difficulty (F(1, 62) = 1.42, p = .24).  
Discussion 
With this study we demonstrated that performing an unusual task heightened 
arousal and as a consequence made people more likely to explore new products. Right-
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handers who used their left hand in an initial task were more interested in trying out a 
variety of new product launches than participants who used their dominant right hand. 
We did not find evidence that mood mediated the effect of task unusualness on 
exploration, suggesting that mood regulation was not at play here. Our findings present 
support for the idea that experiencing novelty inclines people to be more open to new 
experiences. As in all previous studies, performing an unfamiliar task was not perceived 
as more difficult than a familiar task, did not make people more self-aware, and did not 
lower their self-esteem or self-confidence. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Unfamiliar circumstances can severely impact how people behave. Previous 
research has shown that in times of changes in life people break with their habits (Wood, 
et al., 2005) and deviate from their favorite product choices (Wood, 2010). Wood (2010) 
has therefore suggested that experiencing change instigates a mindset of openness to 
change. In this article, we tried to accumulate more evidence for this perspecitive by 
linking novel experiences with uniqueness seeking and explorative consumer behavior. 
We argued that novelty leads to curiosity (Berlyne, 1950), which may lie at the origin of 
openness to new experiences. Our research focused on uniqueness seeking, as an 
instance of openness to new experiences that is relevant in a marketing context. By 
definition, people who have a high need for uniqueness attempt to find ways to 
distinguish themselves from others (McAlister & Pessemier, 1982; Snyder & Fromkin, 
1977; Tian, et al., 2001). It is easier to create a unique and personal style when one thinks 
outside the box, and explores new trends. In four studies we illustrated that performing 
an unfamiliar task increased participants‟ self-perception of uniqueness seeking (Study 
1), made them more likely to buy a scarce box of chocolates (Study 2), encouraged them 
to choose uncommon holiday destinations (Study 3) and motivated them to try out newly 
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launched products (Study 4). We have generalized the impact of unfamiliar 
circumstances to a wide variety of behaviors that are important to consumers.  
Seeing novel visual geometrical shapes also stimulates uniqueness seeking 
(Maimaran & Wheeler, 2008). Whereas Maimaran and Wheeler suggested that exposure 
to unique combinations of symbols activates the concept of uniqueness and primes 
subsequent unique behavior, we propose a second route for subtle environmental cues to 
influence uniqueness through an explorative mindset. In all studies, we chose dependent 
measures of uniqueness that were clearly closely related to explorative consumption 
patterns. Hence we argue that exploring the world, or being open to new experiences, 
underlies uniqueness seeking and can be triggered by unfamiliar actions. Like Maimaran 
and Wheeler, in Study 2 we found that an unfamiliar task boosts uniqueness seeking 
especially among low uniqueness seekers. This strengthens our argument that high 
uniqueness seekers are chronically more open to new experiences. Indeed, in a pilot 
study, we found that need for uniqueness is associated with openness to new 
experiences.  
We have ruled out several alternative explanations for our findings. First of all it 
is important to highlight that perceived task difficulty did not differ between groups who 
performed familiar and unfamiliar tasks in Studies 2, 3 and 4. Whereas task difficulty is 
closely related to each of the alternative explanations that we have discussed, it does not 
ground our explanation of the findings that novelty triggers curiosity and hence an 
interest in unique products. A first alternative explanation could be that an unfamiliar 
task makes people more self-aware which then causes them to act more in line with their 
preexisting self-perceptions of uniqueness (Goukens, et al., 2009). However, conversely, 
we showed in Study 2 that the effect of the unfamiliar task on uniqueness seeking was 
most pronounced among people who have a low need to feel unique. Additionally, task 
unusualness did not affect situational self-awareness in Studies 2, 3 and 4. A second 
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alternative explanation is that an unfamiliar task lowers self-confidence such that 
participants‟ choices would reflect a way to re-bolster their self-confidence (Gao, et al., 
2009). At first sight, one could indeed argue that writing an essay with the nondominant 
hand about one‟s qualities – the manipulation that was used by Gao and colleagues – is 
similar to performing an estimation or choice task with the nondominant hand (Studies 
1, 2 and 4). In their paper Gao et al. generalized their findings and suggested that more 
subtle situational factors, like performing familiar and routinized tasks in unfamiliar 
ways, could trigger metacognitions that something is wrong. Subsequently, this could 
affect ongoing thought about the self and reduce self-confidence. However, we think our 
evidence clearly demonstrates that an unfamiliar task, even a task performed with the 
nondominant hand, in itself does not make people question their abilities or signal that 
something is wrong. Indeed, our manipulations did not affect self-confidence, self-
esteem or mood, all three of which are highly related (Baumgardner, 1990). Instead, an 
unfamiliar task made people excited and eager to learn more about opportunities in the 
environment, which we demonstrate in Study 4. Finally, we showed that our results were 
not driven by mood regulation. It could be that experiencing negative affect would make 
people want to indulge themselves to repair their mood (Tice, et al., 2001). In Study 4 we 
found that performing an unusual task only marginally reduced positive mood and that 
mood did not mediate the effect of task unusualness on explorative consumption.  
Where affect-as-information theory focuses on the impact of incidental affect on 
judgments (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), here we show that people can also discard bodily 
cues when making decisions. We have shown that when people were explicitly told that 
they were about to do a novel task, the impact of task unusualness on uniqueness seeking 
was eliminated (Study 3). This is in line with attribution theories, suggesting that people 
do not make inferences from events when they realize that these events should be 
attributed to aspects of the external situation (Ross, 1977). 
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We proposed that environmental changes lead to exploration just like novelty 
does (Berlyne, 1950). We showed that performing an unusual task increased the 
experience of arousal and stimulated trying out new products. In line with our findings 
that unusual situations trigger openness to new experiences, it was recently found that 
living in and adapting to a foreign culture, or experiencing incongruent emotions makes 
people more creative and think more broadly (Fong, 2006; Huang & Galinsky, in press; 
Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). These effects resulted from novel or uncommon experiences, 
like our manipulations, and have led to more creative and unconventional thinking. We 
suggest that an explorative mindset or being open to new experiences may underlie these 
findings. We showed that openness to experience and uniqueness seeking are positively 
correlated. Prior research also shows that openness to experience, creativity and 
unconventionality are positively correlated (Feist, 1998; McCrae, 1987). Further research 
could explore the causal relationships between novelty, divergent thinking and creativity. 
Moreover, future research should also investigate the boundaries of the effect of novelty 
and arousal on openness to new experiences. Berlyne (1960) has stated that people enjoy 
intermediate levels of arousal. When bored, people seek more stimulation. However, too 
much stimulation is also aversive. Unfamiliar stimuli that by no means relate to what is 
known evoke fear rather than curiosity. The tasks that we used in our studies were new 
to participants, but still related to familiar tasks and hence not aversive.  
In our research we focused on the act of doing things differently and chose to 
make experiencing change very concrete. Whereas previous research about breaking 
habits looked at experiencing changes in one‟s life (Wood, 2010), we wanted to 
investigate if more temporary and subtle deviations from common experience yielded 
similar effects. Bodily actions or postures can strongly influence decision making in ways 
which people are often unaware of (Barsalou, 2008). For example, when clenching their 
fist, people exert more willpower (Hung & Labroo, 2011). Or when carrying a heavy 
weight, the topic one thinks about seems more important (Jostmann, et al., 2009). We 
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operationalized „doing things differently‟ by having our participants do a familiar or 
unfamiliar task. In Studies 1, 2 and 4, right-handers performed a task (i.e., a product 
choice task in Studies 1 and 4, and an estimation task in Study 2) by means of their 
dominant right hand, which is familiar, or their non-dominant left hand, which is 
unfamiliar. In Study 3, participants were confronted with a new multitouch computer 
screen that they either manipulated by touch (unfamiliar) or by a computer mouse 
(familiar). We think the words unusual, unfamiliar and novel can be used 
interchangeably to address the phenomenon we examined in this research. Although we 
believe that unexpected and surprising cues would result in similar effects, we do not 
think that they are synonymous to unusual, unfamiliar and novel. Unexpected and 
surprising seem to follow from having certain expectations, whereas we did not create 
any prior expectations in our studies. 
Our findings increase understanding of how marketing actions can influence 
shoppers along the path to purchase. By breaking up the daily grind, marketers can 
evoke exploration among consumers and make them more likely to try temporary offers 
or test new products. It is especially interesting that the unusual experience can be subtle 
and entirely unrelated to the consumer choice or product explorations that follow. 
Additionally, consumers who would normally stick to their habitual patterns of actions 
are most likely to be affected by subtle environmental changes. Our research suggests 
that novel actions are a powerful tool to change habitual behavior, unless people are 
aware of the source of change. Furthermore, we wish to highlight that novelty should 
probably not be overwhelming to the point that it induces negative affect and turns 
consumers off. Berlyne (1960) suggested that curiosity is induced by novel cues that one 
can relate to what is known. Objects that are unfamiliar in all aspects induce fear instead. 
It is possible that too much stimulation would make people want to search for comfort in 
known and favorite products. For example, recent research indicates that people who 
move frequently prefer familiar over unfamiliar stores (Oishi, Miao, Koo, Kisling, & 
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Ratliff, in press). However, living abroad has also been shown to induce creativity 
(Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). Similarly, Wood‟s studies (2010) did suggest that both 
positive and negative changes in life led to openness to change. Hence the impact of 
aversive novel stimuli is an empirical question open for future investigations. 
Previous research has shown that it is a pleasant surprise to consumers to receive 
in-store coupons (Heilman, Nakamoto, & Rao, 2002). The coupons that consumers 
received were specific to planned purchases. Heilman and colleagues found that the 
number and dollar value of unplanned purchases increased. More specifically, 
consumers made more purchases of treat items, and of products that were cognitively 
related to or placed in close proximity to the product of the surprise coupon. Although it 
has not been tested in the conceptual model by Heilan and colleagues, based on our 
findings, we expect surprise in-store coupons to especially influence purchases of 
products that express uniqueness and are worth exploring. This is just one example to 
show how marketers can trigger a change in mindset. A wide variety of novel actions, like 
changing the design of the company‟s website from time to time, having consumers try 
out a product sample at the entrance of a store, can disrupt consumers‟ habitual thinking 
and stimulate curiosity. Further research could investigate if unfamiliar environments, 
like the airport for infrequent flyers, instigate exploration, such that stores in these 
environments could be recommended to focus attention of consumers on product 
innovations or customization of products.  
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ESSAY 3 
Leave Me as I Am:  
Arm Crossing Consolidates Feelings of Power 
3.  
 
ABSTRACT 
Gestures, movements and facial expressions that people make, have an impact on 
what they feel, want or think. In this research the body posture of arm crossing is 
investigated. We demonstrate that there is no one-to-one relationship between arm 
crossing and feeling powerless, as suggested by previous research. Instead, the impact of 
arm crossing on feelings of power and reliance on external influences differs in function 
of self-esteem. When crossing arms, people with high self-esteem rely less on situational 
cues whereas people with low self-esteem make more context-dependent decisions. 
These differences are mediated by feelings of (lack of) power. Interestingly, people seem 
to associate arm crossing with protecting themselves from external influences (e.g., by a 
sales person). We discuss the implications of our findings for overcoming persuasion 
attempts by others. 
Keywords: nonverbal behavior, body openness, arm crossing, self-esteem, power, 
context-dependency, persuasion 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is amazing how much we communicate with our bodies without speaking. We 
smile when we feel happy, turn our back to someone we would rather ignore, and frown 
our eyebrows when concentrated, to name just a few examples. If body talk guides 
interpersonal communication, it is important to find out not only how nonverbal 
behavior can be interpreted by others, but also how body postures or expressions make 
the actor feel. We investigate the posture of crossing arms in front of the body, and 
demonstrate that it can induce opposite feelings of both power and lack of power. Our 
contribution to existing literature about embodiment effects (e.g., Stepper & Strack, 
1993) is that the impact of a body posture on behavior and thinking may depend on 
individuals‟ dispositions, like self-esteem.  
Research suggests that a constricted posture, like arm crossing, makes people feel 
less powerful (Carney, et al., 2010; Huang, et al., 2011). Now imagine two people who, 
independently, visit a bank to sign up for a mortgage. One is well-informed and knows 
exactly which type of mortgage he wants to obtain, and how he can get it. The other does 
not understand much about the different opportunities and hopes to learn more from 
the bank teller. At first, the bank teller makes both people a not so interesting offer. 
Which next negotiation step would the clients take when crossing their arms in front of 
the body while listening? Arm crossing may induce lower negotiation power and be 
detrimental to finding a good interest rate for a mortgage. However, whereas arm 
crossing has been associated with submission (Gifford, 1994), it has been suggested that 
postures are not always unidirectionally linked to feelings of power, such that contextual 
factors could impact the meaning of a posture (Hall, Coats, & Smith LeBeau, 2005). Arm 
crossing could not only be an act of vulnerability, but also of not giving way to pressure 
(Argyle, 1988). Therefore, one might also expect that this act does not make both people 
feel similar. Could it be that this posture makes some people feel stronger and other 
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people weaker? In this research we investigate how one posture may lead to different 
appraisals of one‟s own power and how these appraisals may influence subsequent 
behavior. In a first study, we demonstrate that the impact of arm crossing on how people 
behave depends on people‟s initial feelings of self-worth. The posture makes people with 
high self-esteem feel even more powerful and adjust less to the environment, whereas it 
lowers feelings of power for people with low self-esteem and makes them think less 
independently. 
Bodily feedback 
Ample research has shown that the gestures, movements and facial expressions 
people make can have an impact on what they feel, want or think. For example, flexing 
the arm, as one would do to grasp something pleasant, induces reward-seeking behavior: 
Consumers are more likely to buy vices when carrying a shopping basket, than when 
pushing a shopping cart (Van den Bergh, et al., in press). In a study by Hung and Labroo 
(2011), it was found that students who had a health goal and held a pen firmly in their 
hand while buying a snack for lunch were more likely to resist unhealthy temptations 
than when they were holding the pen loosely, suggesting that when making a fist, people 
exert more willpower.  
Whereas these findings about consumer choices provide exemplary evidence for 
the phenomenon that people can be affected by bodily movements, most prior research 
studied the impact of emotional body postures and facial expressions on feelings and 
judgments (Duclos, et al., 1989; Flack, Laird, & Cavallaro, 1999; Stepper & Strack, 1993; 
Strack, et al., 1988). It is shown that inducing emotion-specific body postures, just like 
facial expressions, have emotion-specific effects (Duclos, et al., 1989; Flack, et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, people are not necessarily aware of how induced muscle contractions 
affected emotional experiences. When participants rated the humor intensity of cartoons 
while holding a pen between the teeth – facilitating smiling – they rated the cartoons as 
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funnier than while holding a pen between the lips – inhibiting smiling (Strack, et al., 
1988). In the nineteenth century, James (1890) proposed that bodily sensations, like 
heart beat and muscle contractions, could precede cognitive emotional appraisals, and 
are fundamental to the emotional experience itself. We do not tell ourselves consciously 
that we have to run away from a bear, we just run and feel afraid. Renewed interest in 
how the body‟s actions feed back to cognitive processes or experiencing emotions has 
arisen since theories about embodied cognition have emerged. According to embodiment 
theories, actions, emotions and perceptions are the core building blocks of information 
processing (Barsalou, 1999; Damasio, 1989; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg, 1997). 
Concrete physical experiences underlie our understanding of abstract concepts 
(Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Eelen, & Maringer, in press). Imagining, thinking of or 
observing an object, an emotion or an action reactivates the same neural states that were 
active during the initial experience. This can explain why body postures experienced at 
the time of decision making are integrated in subsequent thoughts and emotions. For 
example, stepping backward increases an associated mindset like perspective taking 
(Koch, et al., 2009), and adopting a posture of fear, anger or sadness induces similar 
feelings (Duclos, et al., 1989). Experiencing a body posture or movement can facilitate, 
for example, emotion processing (Niedenthal, et al., 2009), language processing 
(Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), object processing (Tucker & Ellis, 1998) and recall of 
similar experiences (Dijkstra, Kaschak, & Zwaan, 2007; Parzuchowski & Szymkow-
Sudziarska, 2008).  
Interestingly, social power is also associated with nonverbal behavior, like making 
a fist or having an expanded body posture (Carney, et al., 2010; Schubert, 2004). We use 
the term social power throughout this paper as an umbrella to refer to the vertical 
dimension of interpersonal relationships including (socio-economic) status, authority, 
prestige, respect, power, and dominance (Hall, et al., 2005). Note that, in this paper, we 
focus on subjective feelings of power. In the next section we describe how different 
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nonverbal behaviors, and arm crossing in particular, are related to perceptions and 
actual experiences of social power.  
Nonverbal displays of power 
Despite the wide interest in the nonverbal displays of social power (Dovidio & 
Ellyson, 1985; Henley, 1977), there is very little consensus about the behaviors that 
robustly reveal power (for an overview, see Hall, et al., 2005). Whereas some studies 
(e.g., Aguinis, Simonsen, & Pierce, 1998; Keating, Mazur, & Segall, 1977; Knutson, 1996) 
have focused on power perceptions, or the beliefs and stereotypes people have about 
power behaviors, other studies have investigated actual differences in nonverbal 
behavior of individuals who feel powerful or powerless (e.g., Aries, Gold, & Weigel, 1983; 
Dovidio, Ellyson, Keating, Heltman, & Brown, 1988; Gifford, 1991). Hall and colleagues 
(2005) summarized research findings from 1961 to 2002 about power perceptions (120 
studies) and actual power displays (91 studies). Their meta-analysis showed that 
powerful individuals are believed to gaze more, raise eyebrows less, touch themselves 
less but others more, make more arm and hand gestures, have a tenser, more erect or 
forward posture, and stand closer to others than powerless individuals. In contrast to 
this abundance of findings, when looking at actual power displays, it was only found that 
powerful people have a more open body posture and interacted with smaller distance to 
others.  
Recently, body openness has successfully been manipulated to create powerful 
and powerless states in people (Carney, et al., 2010; Huang, et al., 2011). The open and 
expansive body posture that was associated with power had people (participants or 
confederates) sit with one arm on the armrest of their chair and the other arm on the 
back of a nearby chair. Additionally, they crossed their legs such that the ankle of one leg 
rested on the thigh of the other leg and stretched beyond the edge of the chair they sat in. 
In the constricted, closed posture, associated with being powerless, they sat slightly 
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slouched with their legs together and their hands in their lap (Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). 
In comparison with the closed posture, for participants in the expansive posture, power 
was activated implicitly (as measured by the number of created power words in a word-
completion task) and explicitly (by a self-report of power) (Huang, et al., 2011). Carney 
and colleagues (2010) asked participants to hold expansive poses (i.e., powerful posture: 
one relaxed sitting posture, leaning backwards, with arms clasped behind the head with 
elbows out, and legs up on a table, and one standing posture leaning forward with hands 
on the table), or constrictive poses (i.e., powerless posture: one standing posture with 
arm wrap and legs crossed, and one slightly slouched sitting posture with legs slightly 
open, bowed head, shoulders downwards and hands in lap). They showed that these 
postures induced neuroendocrinal and behavioral changes in power. Adopting high (vs. 
low) power postures increased (vs. decreased) participants‟ testosterone level, decreased 
(vs. increased) their cortisol level and led to more (vs. less) risk taking.  
The effect of arm crossing in relation to power, as we wish to study here, has not 
often been studied in isolation. In other studies, together with other nonverbal 
behaviors, it has been classified as (reversed) postural openness (Carney, et al., 2010; 
Hall, et al., 2005), but also as hand/arm gesture (Carney, Hall, & Smith LeBeau, 2005; 
Gifford, 1994). Rated on the overarching level of openness, it was found twice that 
postural openness is related to higher levels of power. This could indicate that arm 
crossing is associated with lower power. Together with other hand and arm gestures, 
Carney et al. (2005) did not find significant results. To the best of our knowledge, only 
Gifford (1994) reported a result that could be attributed solely to arm crossing. 
Participants‟ nonverbal behavior during a 15minute small group interaction, was coded 
extensively. Participants completed a personality questionnaire, and observers were 
asked to do the same basing themselves on the mute video of the participants. By doing 
so, Gifford could analyze to what extent individuals and observers take into account 
different nonverbal behaviors to judge their personality. He found that frequency of arm 
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crossing was negatively correlated with dominance/ambition perceptions by others and 
positively with submission/laziness perceptions by others. However arm crossing was 
not associated with participants‟ own perceptions of dominance or submission. Only 
extraversion was negatively correlated with arm crossing, both for self-perceptions and 
other-perceptions.  
Whereas these findings suggest that arm crossing may be associated with low 
levels of power, the meta-analysis by Hall and colleagues (2005) showed that often the 
findings for main effects of nonverbal behavior on power were very heterogeneous. For 
example, although overall evidence was found for a negative association between power 
and postural relaxation, five reported studies in the analysis showed significantly less 
postural relaxation for powerful individuals, whereas three studies showed significantly 
more relaxation for powerful individuals. Hall et al. argue that contextual moderators 
may be important to interpret the impact of nonverbal postures on feelings of power. It 
is not unlikely that for someone being nervous and polite an erect body posture is 
considered a sign of low power, whereas for someone who is proud and confident the 
same erect posture may signal high power. Wide categories of nonverbal behaviors (like 
smiling) are not unidirectionally related to how people feel. For example, a duchenne 
smile (with wrinkling eyes) reveals a smile of enjoyment, whereas a “false” smile without 
any eye wrinkles may mask discontentment (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990; Ekman 
& Friesen, 1982). Hall et al. (2005) highlight the need to specify the meaning of 
nonverbal behaviors. In relation to contextual factors or inner states, different functions 
of one body posture can explain discrepancies in association with power. Arm crossing 
has been associated with defensiveness, but also with vigilance and unyielding (Argyle, 
1988; Bull, 1987). We try to reconcile these functions, by investigating the different 
impact of this body posture for individuals with different inner states. We study the 
impact of arm crossing for individuals who differ in self-esteem. 
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Self-esteem 
In general self-esteem can be defined as the degree to which we evaluate 
ourselves positively or negatively. Not only do high self-esteem individuals evaluate 
themselves more positively – for instance, in terms of popularity and attractiveness – 
than low self-esteem individuals do, but they also seem to do better in life than low self-
esteem individuals. For example, people who have high self-esteem, persist longer when 
facing failure, promote initiative, have fewer eating disorders, and tend to perform better 
at school (for an overview of self-esteem effects, see Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & 
Vohs, 2003). For years, it has been suggested that high self-esteem is related to well-
being and is therefore in itself worth striving for. However, high self-esteem does not 
seem to be the cause of major successes in life, but rather fluctuates together with 
achievements and failures. Sociometer theory explains when and why shifts in self-
esteem may occur by framing self-esteem as an internal monitor that signals how others 
perceive us (Leary, 1999; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). It is argued that 
people need to observe to what extent they belong to their social group or risk to get 
excluded. Feelings of low self-esteem alert the danger of social exclusion and help people 
change behavior in order to remain accepted within the social group. If self-esteem is 
used as a means to check one‟s position in a social group, we believe it is interesting to 
explore how arm crossing informs people with different levels of self-esteem about their 
social power. In the next section, we propose how two different meanings of arm 
crossing, namely being defensive and unyielding, can be associated with different levels 
of self-esteem and have an impact on social power and resistance to external influences. 
Hypothesis development  
Whereas most research suggests that arm crossing is associated with experiencing 
low power (Hall, et al., 2005), the body posture has also been suggested to have more 
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specific meanings, like expressing defensiveness or not giving way to pressure or 
persuasion (Argyle, 1988). As arm crossing is an ambiguous body posture that can both 
be linked to feelings of being powerful and powerless, we argue that arm crossing will 
have a different impact on people‟s behavior and mindset dependent on prior feelings of 
self-esteem. People with higher self-esteem have a more internal locus of control than 
people with lower self-esteem (Judge, et al., 2002). If high self-esteem individuals are 
“internals” who believe that the behaviors they undertake are effective in reaching a goal, 
arm crossing may most likely activate the meaning of unyielding, and increase 
individuals‟ feelings of power in comparison with adopting a neutral posture. On the 
other hand, for low self-esteem people, who tend to have an external locus of control, 
lack self-confidence, and do not expect their behaviors to be successful in reaching a 
goal, arm crossing may activate the meaning of acting defensive or being vulnerable, and 
decrease feelings of power in comparison with adopting a neutral posture.  
H1: In comparison with a neutral posture, arm crossing heightens power for 
individuals with high self-esteem 
H2: In comparison with a neutral posture, arm crossing lowers power for 
individuals with low self-esteem 
In addition to a differential impact on feelings of power, we hypothesize that arm 
crossing will change the extent to which low and high self-esteem individuals rely on 
contextual information. Powerful individuals think more abstractly (Smith & Trope, 
2006). They go beyond exact details of a situation, look at the core aspects of the task 
and may be less context-dependent. Indeed, powerful individuals were less influenced by 
both social and nonsocial situational cues than powerless individuals (or individuals in a 
baseline condition) when, for instance, generating ideas or expressing opinions 
(Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, & Whitson, 2008). Also, internal locus of control increases 
psychological reactance against external influences, whereas external locus of control 
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increases conformity with persuasion attempts by others (Biondo & MacDonald, 1971). 
Taken together, if arm crossing induces the feeling of being powerless for low self-esteem 
individuals, it may increase reliance on situational cues. On the other hand, as arm 
crossing may activate feelings of bein powerful for high self-esteem individuals, it may 
decrease reliance on situational cues. 
 H3: In comparison with a neutral posture, arm crossing decreases context-
dependency for individuals with high self-esteem 
H4: In comparison with a neutral posture, arm crossing increases context-
dependency for individuals with low self-esteem 
Before turning to a pilot study in which we explore perceptions of arm crossing, 
and a first behavioral study in which we test these hypotheses, we highlight that gender 
differences exist in nonverbal displays of power. Therefore we believe it is important to 
take into account the potential impact of gender on our research findings. 
Gender differences in nonverbal displays of power 
The impact of gender on power displays has been studied frequently (Dovidio, et 
al., 1988; Halberstadt & Saitta, 1987; Henley, 1977; Schubert, 2004). Henley (1977) 
stated that natural differences between men and women in nonverbal behavior reflect 
differences in power displays, with nonverbal behavior of men being equal to high power 
poses and nonverbal behavior of women being exemplar for low power poses. Although 
Henley‟s theory has been very impactful and widely been cited, many researchers have 
casted doubt on her propositions (Dovidio, et al., 1988; Halberstadt & Saitta, 1987; Hall 
& Friedman, 1999). For example, in studying gaze during listening and speaking, 
Dovidio et al. (1988) have demonstrated that men and women with equal power did not 
differ in their behaviors. Only if no clear power difference with the interaction partner 
was perceived, women had the tendency to show low power displays (looking more while 
  
 
77 
listening than while speaking) and men acted like having high power (looking more 
when speaking, and looking less while listening). Hall and Friedman (1999) found robust 
gender differences in nonverbal displays that did not disappear when controlling for 
status. Additionally, high status was displayed differently by men and women, with 
women being more open and supportive in their nonverbal behavior than men. Even 
though this overview is far from conclusive, it pinpoints that we need to consider the 
possible impact of gender differences in nonverbal displays of power. Indeed, Schubert 
(2004) found that making a fist, associated with bodily force, activated the concept of 
power for men and women. However, it induced hope for control in men and reduced 
hope for control in women. 
 In line with Henley‟s theory (1977) and Schubert‟s findings (2004), the effect of 
gender could parallel the effect of self-esteem: When men cross arms in front of the 
body, they may feel more powerful; on the other hand, when women cross arms, they 
may feel less powerful. Alternatively, in line with Hall and Friedman‟s findings (1999), it 
could be that crossing arms is not associated with displaying power for one of both 
genders. This would mean that our proposed pattern of results could be absent for men 
or women. Gender is included in analyses to explore these suggestions. 
Perceptions of arm crossing in a sales context 
We performed a pilot study to find out if consumers consider arm crossing a good 
or bad posture to adopt when being persuaded. We asked people to imagine that a sales 
person would try to convince them to buy a product they did not plan on purchasing. 
Subsequently we asked them to choose which of two postures they would prefer to adopt 
while listening to the sales person. Participants could choose between two pictures of a 
person (matched in gender), one where the person, in an upright posture, was holding 
the arms neutrally next to the body and one where the person was crossing the arms in 
front of the body. A large majority of participants chose the picture of the person 
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crossing the arms (77%, χ²(N=83) = 24.40, p < .0001). Gender did not affect this 
distribution (Women: 73%, Men: 80%, χ²(N = 83) = .60, p = .44). Level of prior self-
esteem ( = .88) (Rosenberg, 1965) did not affect the likelihood of choosing the crossed 
arms posture (Wald χ²(1) = .02, p = .90). Although it is difficult to draw firm conclusions 
from a null finding, these data suggest that people with low self-esteem are equally likely 
as people with high self-esteem to cross their arms in front of their body when 
experiencing a persuasion attempt. People, no matter their feelings of self-worth, seem 
to have a lay theory dictating that crossing the arms could potentially protect themselves 
from external influences. To move beyond perceptions and explore the impact of arm 
crossing on how people behave, we conducted a behavioral lab study to test our 
hypotheses. 
STUDY 1 
In this study we measure initial feelings of self-worth and manipulate body 
posture of participants (arm crossing vs. neutral) to find out if inner states would lead to 
different appraisals of arm crossing on feelings of social power and its behavioral 
consequences. We measured power by means of a self-report and we assessed context-
dependency with a cognitive task. We propose that arm crossing will lower power for 
individuals with low self-esteem and heighten context-dependency, but heighten power 
for individuals with high self-esteem and lower context-dependency. 
Method 
In return for partial course credit, 53 business students (28 women) were invited 
individually in the lab. First, we measured participants‟ self-esteem by the Rosenberg 
scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and by the single item scale “I have high self-esteem” (Robins, et 
al., 2001) (on 7-point items ranging from 1 “Totally don’t agree” until 7 “Totally agree”). 
Next, participants were asked to take part in a marketing test about ergonomic chairs. 
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This cover story has been used before to manipulate body postures without any reference 
to the emotional states they induce (Huang, et al., 2011). The test required participants 
to sit in a fixed posture for about three minutes. In the “crossed arms condition” 
participants were instructed to sit straight against the back of the chair and cross their 
arms in front of their body. In the “neutral condition” participants also had to sit straight 
against the back of the chair, but they were asked to hold their arms loose to the side of 
their body. Figure 3.1 visualizes both postures. The experimenter told participants that 
questions about the ergonomic chair would follow after the test phase. During the test 
phase the experimenter was present in the room to make sure that the participant 
adopted the right posture. Subsequently, participants rated how comfortable the chair 
was, and how comfortable, easy and tiring it was to hold the posture (on 7-point scales 
ranging from 1 “not at all” to 7 “very”). Following this, in seemingly unrelated tasks, we 
measured mood by an ad hoc one item scale (“How do you feel at this moment”, scored 
from 1 “very negatively” to 7 “very positively”) and perceived power by assessing the 
Scales A (dominance,  = .49) and I (submission,  = .53) of the Wiggins (1979) 
Interpersonal Adjective Scale (IAS). The last task for participants was the framed-line 
test (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). On each page of a leaflet, two 
different sized squared frames were printed, one with a vertical line hanging from the 
top in the middle and one empty square. In five trials, we asked participants to draw a 
line in the empty square of which the length was identical to the length of the line in the 
first square. With this absolute length task, it is possible to capture the extent to which 
people ignore contextual information. People who are more accurate in copying the 
absolute length of the printed line, are better in ignoring the different sizes of the 
squared frames and hence less context-dependent. Finally, participants were thanked 
and debriefed.  
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Figure 3.1. Body postures in Study 1: arm crossing vs. neutral posture. 
 
Results 
For each participant, we measured the deviation of the drawn lines from the 
printed lines (in millimeters) and calculated the average error as a measure of context-
dependency. Higher scores indicate larger context-dependency. Because it is possible 
that longer printed lines lead to larger deviations, we also calculated the percentage of 
error in function of the length of the printed lines. All analyses were performed with the 
absolute error and with the percentage error. Since no differences emerged, we report 
results with the absolute error. Due to technical problems, the self-esteem scores on the 
Rosenberg scale could not be used. However, as we also assessed self-esteem by means 
of the validated one-item scale developed by Robins et al. (2001), we continued working 
with this measure. 
To start with, we standardized all continuous measures. Next, we calculated a 
Mahalanobis distance (within each posture condition) for each participant (based on the 
correlation between self-esteem and average error) to determine outlying participants 
(Mahalanobis, 1936; Zijlstra, van der Ark, & Sijtsma, 2011). One participant was 
identified as an outlier, having a distance higher than the .99 fractile in the Chi-square 
distribution (df = 1), and was excluded from further analyses. 
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Mood. Mood did not differ between posture conditions (F(1, 51) = .07, p = .80). 
Additionally, a GLM analysis on mood with posture and self-esteem as independent 
variables did not result into significant main or interaction effects on mood (all ps > .21). 
Chair and posture ratings. Posture did not affect the ratings of chair comfort 
(F(1, 51) = .43, p = .52) and posture comfort (F(1, 51) = .06, p = .80). However, crossing 
arms was rated more tiring (M = 2.77, SD = 1.39) than holding the neutral posture (M = 
2.08, SD = 1.09; F(1, 51) = 3.97, p = .05). Additionally, there was a marginal significant 
effect of posture on ease of holding the pose, with the neutral posture being easier (M = 
4.85, SD = 1.46) than crossing arms (M = 4.15, SD = 1.46; F(1, 51) = 2.92, p = .09). When 
we performed separate GLM analyses with posture and self-esteem as independent 
variables and each of the ratings as the dependent variable, we found no main effects of 
self-esteem (all ps > .34) or interactions (all ps > .28) and the main effects of posture 
remained largely the same. To make sure that our results are not driven by differences in 
ease or fatigue in holding postures, we control for these variables in all further analyses. 
However, controlling for ease or fatigue did not change the pattern of results.  
Gender. Gender did not affect feelings of power (p > .20) or degree of context-
dependency (p > .74). In the findings we report below, adding gender as a covariate, or 
allowing for a three-way-interaction between gender, posture and self-esteem, its main 
effect, or interactions with posture and self-esteem never reached significance nor did it 
change the pattern of results.  
Perceived power. We conducted a GLM analysis on perceived power 
(aggregate of A and I scale,  = .67) with posture and self-esteem as independent 
between-subject variables, and controlling for ease and fatigue of posture. The main 
effects of posture, ease and fatigue were not significant (all ps > .27). We found a main 
effect of self-esteem (β = .83, F(1, 46) = 10.50, p = .002), indicating that participants 
with low self-esteem (M - 1SD) felt less powerful (M = -.43, SE = .18) than participants 
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with high (M - 1SD) self-esteem (M = .39, SE = .18). Most importantly however, the 
expected interaction between posture and self-esteem was close to significance (F(1, 46) 
= 3.81, p = .06). By means of slopes and simple effects analyses, we took a closer look at 
the predicted pattern of interaction (see Figure 3.2). As expected, people with high self-
esteem (M + 1SD) felt more powerful when crossing arms (M = .78, SE = .24) than when 
posing in a neutral posture (M = .002, SE = .28; t(51) = 2.11, p = .04). Although we 
expected the opposite pattern for people with low self-esteem (M - 1SD), namely that 
crossing arms made these participants feel less powerful than being in a neutral posture, 
the difference was not significant (Mcrossed = -.54, SEcrossed = .25; Mneutral = -.33, SEneutral = 
.25; t(51) = -.58, p = .60). Importantly however, we found that the differential effect of 
self-esteem on power occurred for participants who crossed arms (β = 1.32, t(51) = 4.06, 
p = .0002), but not for participants in the neutral posture (β = .33, t(51) = .85, p = .40). 
Because perceived power relies on a self-report of feelings, and people with low self-
esteem may be reluctant to report a lack of power, it may be a conservative test of our 
hypothesis. Hence, we turn to behavioral data, provided by the framed-line test, to find 
out if a more pronounced pattern of results is obtained. 
 
Figure 3.2. Power as a function of posture and prior self-esteem.  
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Average error. Again, we executed a GLM analysis with posture and self-
esteem as independent between-subject variables, and controlling for ease and fatigue of 
posture to explain the variance in context-dependency. The main effects of posture, self-
esteem and fatigue were not significant (all ps > .35). The main effect of ease was 
significant (β = -.95, F(1, 46) = 8.91, p = .005). Participants who rated the posture easy 
to carry out (M + 1SD) made fewer errors (M = 3.01, SE = .22) than participants who 
rated it as difficult (M - 1SD) (M = 3.97, SE = .22). In line with our predictions we found 
a significant interaction between posture and self-esteem (F(1, 46) = 12.62, p = .0009) 
(see Figure 3.3). Simple effects analyses revealed that with arm crossing low self-esteem 
individuals became more context-dependent (M = 4.15, SE = .31) than in a neutral 
posture (M = 3.12, SE = .32; t(51) = 2.29, p = .03). The opposite pattern was present for 
high self-esteem individuals. Arm crossing made these individuals less context-
dependent (M = 2.73, SE = .29) than a neutral posture (M = 3.95, SE = .35; t(51) = -2.64, 
p = .01). Focusing on the effect of each posture, we found that when crossing the arms, 
greater self-esteem makes people less context-dependent (β = -1.42, t(51) = -3.49, p = 
.001), whereas in a neutral posture, only a marginal, opposite, effect emerged (β = .83, 
t(51) = 1.70, p = .10) suggesting that greater self-esteem leads to slightly more context-
dependency. 
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Figure 3.3. Context-dependency as a function of posture and prior self-
esteem.  
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
Mediated moderation. So far, we found that arm crossing together with higher 
levels of self-esteem made individuals less context-dependent and feel more powerful. To 
test if the moderation of self-esteem and posture on context-dependency is mediated by 
power, we executed a mediated moderation analysis. When adding perceived power as 
an additional variable to a GLM analysis on context-dependency with posture and self-
esteem as independent between-subject variables, and controlling for ease and fatigue of 
posture, we found that the interaction of posture with self-esteem had a reduced, but still 
significant impact (p = .006). The main effect of power was significant (F(1, 45) = 6.80, p 
= .01), with powerful individuals being less context-dependent (Mpower + 1SD = 3.03, SE = 
.23) than powerless individuals (Mpower - 1SD = 3.93, SE = .22). These findings suggest 
that power partially mediates the moderating effect of posture by self-esteem on context-
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arms, but not when they were in a neutral posture – see Figure 3.4 for a visualization – 
we made use of the modmed procedure in SPSS (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). As 
expected, the conditional indirect effect for the crossed arms condition was significant (z 
= -2.15, p = .03), whereas it was not for the neutral condition (z = -.76, p = .45). Taken 
altogether these findings suggest that crossing the arms in front of the body boosts 
(lowers) individuals‟ feelings of power when having high (low) self-esteem and thereby 
impacts context-dependency. However, as already indicated by the analyses on power, 
when formally testing the effect of arm crossing vs. the neutral posture through power on 
context-dependency for low and high self-esteem individuals, we find that power 
mediates the effect of body posture on context-dependency for high self-esteem 
individuals (indirect effect tested with 1000 bootstraps, 95% CI = [-.97, -.03]), but not 
for low self-esteem individuals (1000 bootstraps, 95% CI = [-.16, .58]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Outline of mediated moderation.  
Arm crossing alters perceived power as a function of initial feelings of 
self-esteem, and, as a consequence, context-dependency, whereas a 
neutral posture does not affect power or context-dependency.  
Note. Numbers indicate coefficients, numbers between brackets indicate 
standard errors. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, **** p < .0001. 
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DISCUSSION 
In this research we investigated the impact of arm crossing on feelings of social 
power. Recently it was found that body postures can influence feelings of power, such 
that expanded postures led to higher feelings of power than constricted body postures 
(Carney, et al., 2010). Literature suggests that the body posture of arm crossing is 
associated with low power (Gifford, 1994; Hall, et al., 2005). However, more specific 
functions have been appointed to this body posture. It has been associated with being 
defensive and unyielding (Argyle, 1988; Bull, 1987). Because arm crossing seems an 
ambiguous body posture that can be associated with vulnerability, but also with being in 
control of a situation, we proposed that this posture could have different meanings for 
people dependent on their dispositions. We suggest that individual differences in self-
esteem could explain whether people associate the posture with successful (and hence 
feeling powerful) or unsuccessful protection against external influences (i.e., feeling 
powerless). Feelings of self-esteem are used in an interpersonal context to monitor how 
others perceive us (Leary, et al., 1995). Nonverbal cues like arm crossing could be added 
to this monitoring process and guide us in how to behave. Higher self-esteem is 
associated with feelings of self-efficacy and a more internal locus of control (Judge, et al., 
2002). In contrast to low self-esteem individuals, high self-esteem individuals believe 
they are in control of their own actions to manipulate the course of events. Therefore the 
posture of arm crossing may be more related to unyielding for high self-esteem 
individuals, but more related to acting defensive for low self-esteem individuals. Hence, 
arm crossing may (re)activate these respective feelings. 
In a first study we found that the impact of arm crossing on feelings of power was 
moderated by levels of self-esteem. Arm crossing makes self-confident individuals feel 
more powerful than unconfident individuals. In comparison with a neutral posture, self-
confident participants who posed with crossed arms considered themselves more 
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powerful. Although we expected to find the opposite pattern for less confident 
participants, i.e., lowered feelings of power, we did not find significant differences 
between arm crossing and a neutral body posture. This could be due to the fact that 
feelings of power were measured by means of a self-report. It is possible that low self-
esteem individuals were reluctant to report very low levels of power. 
However, we did not only assess self-reports if power, but also conducted the 
framed-line task, a behavioral measure of context-dependency. Powerful people are 
more abstract thinkers and are better in focusing on the central aspects of a task (Smith 
& Trope, 2006). They are less influenced by situational cues when making decisions 
(Galinsky, et al., 2008). As we expected, we showed that, in comparison with a neutral 
posture, arm crossing lowered context-dependency for high self-esteem individuals, 
whereas it heightened context-dependency for low self-esteem individuals. This pattern 
was mediated by perceived power. Self-esteem and context-dependency were negatively 
related through feelings of power for arm crossing, but not in a neutral posture. These 
findings indicate that arm crossing can have different meanings dependent on one‟s 
associations with that bodily state. Note however that in comparison with the neutral 
posture, we did find a stronger impact of arm crossing on high self-esteem individuals 
(i.e., increased power) than on low self-esteem individuals (i.e., decreased power). This 
in itself is an interesting finding, because in the past arm crossing has mostly been 
associated with feelings of low power. 
We did not find any effects of gender. Gender did not mimic the moderating effect 
of self-esteem on arm crossing interpretation. Unlike Schubert‟s findings (2004) that 
making a fist lowers power for women and heightens power for men, our findings 
suggest that arm crossing has similar functions to both men and women. 
Interestingly, the performance in the absolute framed-line test is related to 
interpersonal influence and adjustment (at least in Western cultures) (Miyamoto & 
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Wilken, 2010). The less people are context-dependent, the more they assert the self and 
think they can change others. Larger errors, or heavier context-dependency, indicate that 
people suppress themselves more and conform to other. We also pointed to the fact that 
self-esteem is associated with locus of control (Judge, et al., 2002). Locus of control in its 
turn affect degree of conformity to external influences (Biondo & MacDonald, 1971). 
Therefore, in future research we could test more explicitly if arm crossing has an impact 
on persuasion, and whether this impact depends on levels of self-esteem.  
We performed a pilot study to find out if consumers consider arm wrap a good or 
bad posture to adopt when being persuaded. We found that people believe that arm 
crossing can protect them from being persuaded by a sales person. However in a 
behavioral lab study we demonstrate that people with low self-esteem may not benefit 
from this strategy. As we have shown, arm crossing elicits feelings of being powerless for 
unconfident people. As a consequence it may be easier to persuade them, as they adopt 
an arm wrap posture. More generally, it would also be interesting to investigate different 
effects of context-dependency in consumer settings. Anchoring effects (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), the attraction and compromise effect (Simonson, 1989) should 
increase for unconfident individuals who cross arms.  
Two routes through which the motor system can influence the affective system 
have been assumed (Neumann & Strack, 2000). On the one hand, people can 
consciously interpret their perceived bodily sensations as indicative for the feelings they 
hence must have (Buck, 1980; Laird, 1974). On the other hand, as individuals are not 
necessarily aware of how induced muscle patterns affect emotional experiences (e.g., 
Strack, et al., 1988), there is evidence for a more direct path from the motor system to 
the affective system, suggesting that cognitive attribution is not a necessary mediator of 
effects found. In Study 1, we made use of a between-subjects design to manipulate body 
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postures. This made it less likely that participants were aware of the power manipulation 
and could consciously attribute arm wrap to self-perceptions of power.  
There are several limitations to the study that we have conducted that need to be 
addressed in follow-up research. Self-esteem was measured as a trait, but can also be 
manipulated, for example by providing bogus feedback about one‟s personality 
(Greenberg, et al., 1992). We have studied one isolated movement, whereas often 
nonverbal behaviors occur in patterns. Hence, our test was a conservative one, making a 
strong point for the strength of arm crossing as a meaningful nonverbal cue in and by 
itself. However, it could be that in natural circumstances, arm crossing that 
communicates defensiveness go along with a more constricted body posture, whereas 
arm crossing that communicates unyielding may be combined more frequently with an 
expanded body posture. It would be interesting to have people pose with their arms 
crossed, and analyze if body expansiveness covaries with self-esteem. If this is the case, 
then body expansiveness may be a good signal for interpreting the function of arm 
crossing at a given point in time.  
Finally in future research we could investigate more specifically whether arm 
crossing is associated with different prior experiences of low and high self-esteem 
individuals. We speculate that the meaning of defensive arm crossing may result from 
unsuccessful protection against external influences in the past, whereas the meaning of 
unyielding may result from successful protection against external influences in the past, 
or even successful persuasion attempts of oneself. These different experiences could 
correlate with feelings of self-esteem. To investigate this reasoning, we could adapt an 
experimental design of Dijkstra et al. (2007) to have people think back about 
autobiographic (successful and unsuccessful) persuasion attempts by others in a neutral 
posture or with arms crossed. If self-esteem is manipulated prior to this task, then we 
expect low self-esteem to be congruent with arm crossing and thinking back about 
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successful persuasion attempts by others, whereas high self-esteem should be congruent 
with crossing arms and thinking back about unsuccessful persuasion attempts by others. 
Congruence should then facilitate memory recall, whereas incongruence should inhibit 
recall. Alternative explanations for the differential impact of arm crossing on feelings of 
power and context-dependency should be explored. For instance, it could be that arm 
crossing does not have different meanings, like unyielding and being defensive, but 
rather one meaning that consolidates habitual patterns of thinking and behaving. For 
instance, arm crossing could increase interpersonal distance, and as a consequence, 
heighten focus on the self and make people act and think more in line with their 
dispositions.  
Our research contributes to literature about nonverbal behavior and embodied 
cognition in that it shows that one body posture can have very opposite effects on 
cognition and behavior for different people. It should be explored further why 
perceptions about the meaning of arm crossing and its actual effects on behavior differ, 
as these differences have large consequences on how people behave in an interpersonal 
context.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In three essays we explored the situated and embodied nature of consumer 
behavior. We showed that bodily movements and postures influence how consumers 
think and evaluate products. However, the concrete underlying theoretical processes in 
the three essays were different. Here I summarize our findings, and look forward to the 
future by discussing the limitations, and touching upon open questions, as yielded by our 
research. 
 
ESSAY 1 
In essay 1, we investigated how ease of grasping products affects consumers‟ 
preferences. For right-handers it is easier to grasp products with handles oriented 
rightwards than leftwards. The opposite is true for left-handers, who prefer 
manipulating products with the left hand. If people have a preference for products 
oriented in a way that they can easily interact with them, this would speak to the idea 
that bodily actions impact decisions. We outlined two mechanisms through which 
feelings of ease can be experienced and impact preference construction. Experiencing 
fluency of action could result from a strong learned grasping pattern that fits well with 
how a product is oriented (i.e., a product handle oriented rightwards for someone who is 
used to grasping products with the right hand). We showed that right-handers who have 
a strong preference to manipulate objects with the right hand, find a product with its 
handle rightwards more attractive than one with its handle leftwards. However this 
automatic bodily driven effect only occurred when more conscious processing was 
inhibited. On the other hand, experiencing fluency can also follow from a situational fit 
between the body and the actions permitted by objects (i.e., handles oriented leftwards 
communicate acting with the left hand, whereas handles oriented rightwards trigger 
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actions with the right hand). More flexible right-handers have a preference for products 
oriented rightwards, and do so because they match environmental characteristics with 
what their body permits at the time of decision. This was demonstrated by showing that 
flexible right-handers pay more attention to orientation cues than rigid right-handers, 
flexible right-handers‟ preference shifted to products oriented leftwards when explicitly 
asked to make choices with the left hand whereas this did not affect rigid right-handers‟ 
decisions, and finally by showing that mental resources are needed for flexible right-
handers in order to show an effect of ease of grasping.  
One limitation of our research is that the findings seem restricted to products 
with handles. However, the effect of ease of mental simulation on preference 
construction could possibly be extended past these first results. It is for instance worth 
investigating if unwrapped products are more attractive and lead to higher purchase 
intentions than wrapped products of which the package depicts an image of the product. 
It could be easier to simulate product usage with unwrapped than with wrapped 
products. Additionally, this effect could be strongest for individuals who have a high 
need for touching objects (Peck & Childers, 2003).  
Another limitation of our research is that we focused on right-handers, as they are 
the majority of the population. Forthcoming research by Elder and Aradhna (in press) 
that addresses the impact of mental simulations on purchase intentions included left-
handers and found similar effects of ease of grasping, no matter handedness. However, 
their research did not make a distinction between strong and flexible left- or right-
handers. Interestingly, also left-handers seem to differ in handedness flexibility 
(Gonzalez & Goodale, 2009). Thus, it would be interesting to see if our findings can be 
replicated for strong and flexible left-handers. 
Based on our research it seems that more flexible right-handers incorporate 
situational cues more in their decision making processes. They paid more attention to 
  
 
93 
product handles than rigid right-handers did. Therefore, further research could explore 
if the difference in dexterity flexibility generalizes to more general differences in context-
dependency. If flexible right-handers rely more heavily on situational cues, they might 
also do so for situational cues (e.g., incidental affect) that are unrelated to handedness 
and product manipulations.  
The motor fluency effect for flexible right-handers involved the presence of 
sufficient mental capacity. This highlights that relying on mental simulations is not 
synonymous to superficial processing of product information. In line with these findings, 
in emotion processing research, it was found that reading words with an emotional 
valence (e.g., “vomit” or “happy”) activated emotional facial musculature when 
participants processed the emotional meaning of the words, but did not so when 
shallowly processing nonemotional properties of the words, like letter case (Niedenthal, 
et al., 2009). Elaborating on these findings, we do not expect product orientation to 
impact consumers‟ choices when they are compare products explicitly by, for instance, 
price, which does not involve motor simulations. The focus of the decision strategy is one 
of the potential boundaries of the motor fluency effect that could be studied in future 
research. 
One may wonder whether ease of grasping coincides with ease of imagining 
product usage. It is often suggested that mental simulations that occur during 
information processing and (more explicit) imagery speak to the same neural structures 
in the brain (e.g., Farah, 1989; Jeannerod, 1995). Functional actions with products are 
activated when confronted with pictures (Helbig, et al., 2006), hence it could be that 
explicitly imagining how to use a product is easier if grasping is facilitated, which in turn 
could lead to increased attractiveness. If imagery is similar to mental simulations, this 
may be an easy route to amplifying the effect, because in advertising, imagery can be 
triggered by simply adding phrases like “Picture yourself…”. However, recently it has 
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been shown that action understanding activates motor regions in the brain that can be 
dissociated from motor regions that are active during action imagery (Willems, et al., 
2010). Therefore it could also be hypothesized that inexplicit mental simulations of 
grasping would be overruled by explicitly asking participants to imagine how to use the 
products. Until now, it remains unclear whether the grasping fluency effect would 
amplify or disappear. The dissociation between simulations and imagery is an interesting 
avenue for further research. 
 
ESSAY 2 
Whereas in essay 1 we focused on preference construction as a result of the 
interaction between grasping tendencies of individuals and actions that are 
communicated by product handles, in essay 2 we investigated how trivial unusual 
actions affect decision making. Previous research has suggested that changes in life 
instigate openness to change (Wood, 2010). We made more specific predictions, and 
argued that engaging in novel behavior triggers an explorative mindset, making people 
more likely to discover their surroundings for new opportunities. We showed that 
performing an unusual action made people more likely to explore novel or uncommon 
choice alternatives. To fully test our predictions, we would like to conduct another study 
that distinguishes between variety seeking and novelty seeking. If unusual situations 
lead to exploration, we hypothesize that people would not just deviate from their favorite 
products and choose different but known products, rather they would be attracted by 
unknown alternatives. We would manipulate the unusualness of a situation and 
investigate, for example, purchase intentions for potato chips. Someone with a 
preference for sour cream and onion chips, should then show an increased preference for 
shrimp flavored chips (currently not on the market and hence novel) but not for ranch 
dressing flavored chips (currently on the market). This could strengthen our findings of 
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Study 4 in which conventional products were not tested. Now we can only speculate that 
our findings are due to the novelty of all tested items. 
So far, our studies centered the attention on need for uniqueness. Need for 
uniqueness is a social dimension on which individuals can differ. In the context of 
consumer behavior, need for uniqueness is characterized by buying unusual or novel 
products or combining products in an uncommon way to express uniqueness in 
comparison to other consumers. We considered consumer need for uniqueness as an 
interesting instance of explorative behavior that is relevant to marketers. High 
uniqueness seekers tend to be interested in scarce or novel products, and care about 
customization more than low uniqueness seekers do. Therefore, stores in unusual places 
(e.g., in the airport), which may trigger exploration in consumers, could focus more on 
promoting customization of products, and uncommon sales offers. Nevertheless, we 
think it is important to further investigate the process that underlies uniqueness seeking 
and focus less on need for uniqueness as a phenomenon. We proposed that uncommon 
behavior leads to openness to new experiences or novelty seeking. Therefore in follow-up 
research we will test if the effect of unusualness on novelty seeking is mediated by an 
increased level of curiosity. Additionally, we expect the effect of unusualness on novelty 
seeking to be moderated by initial levels of openness to new experiences. Similar to our 
findings in Study 2, we anticipate that unusual actions will mainly boost purchase 
intentions for novel product options of individuals who are low novelty-seekers in 
general, because individuals who are chronically open to new experiences might always 
seek novelty. 
In our studies we made use of two different manipulations of unusualness. First, 
for right-handers it is more unusual to perform actions with the left hand, than with the 
right hand. Second, making use of a large touch screen monitor is less usual than 
working with a computer mouse. Whereas both manipulations focused on actual unusual 
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behavior, we believe that our findings could be extended to experiencing uncommon 
situations without having participants undertake action. As stated above, a store in the 
airport may induce similar effects of exploration. Therefore we would like to replicate 
our findings by manipulating the unusualness of the situation (e.g., carrying a new type 
of shopping basket, sitting on a new type of chair) rather than the unusualness of 
actions.   
Future research could also investigate if novel situations induce a mindset of 
novelty seeking or a goal to act in a novel way. If participants would continue to make 
novel choices after a first decision, this would suggest that novelty instigates a mindset of 
novelty seeking. On the other hand, if a second choice would reveal a return to favorite 
product options, this suggests that novelty leads to the temporary goal of acting novel or 
standing out of the crowd that can be satiated by making one explorative choice. 
 
ESSAY 3 
Research about embodied cognition has concentrated mostly on bodily effects in 
which one sensation is unilaterally linked to behavior or thinking (e.g., heavy is 
important, Jostmann, et al., 2009; or pushing away is aversive, Van den Bergh, et al., in 
press). In our last essay however, we showed that one body posture can lead to very 
dissimilar effects for different people. Crossing arms in front of the body can be 
associated with vulnerability, but also with power (Argyle, 1988). Dependent on people‟s 
dispositions, and experiences in life, arm crossing may activate one of both meanings. 
Because, higher self-esteem is related to a more internal locus of control (Judge, et al., 
2002), we proposed that arm crossing triggers feelings of power for high self-esteem 
individuals, but defensiveness, or lack of social power for low self-esteem individuals. 
Additionally, powerful individuals think more abstractly (Smith & Trope, 2006) and 
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feeling in control makes people react against persuasion attempts by others (Biondo & 
MacDonald, 1971). Hence, we studied how different levels of self-esteem could lead to 
differences in reliance on contextual cues as a function of arm crossing. 
We demonstrated that arm crossing increases power feelings and context-
independency together with higher levels of prior self-esteem, whereas a neutral posture 
did not create such a difference. Differences between neutral and crossed arm posture 
were most pronounced for high self-esteem individuals: Individuals with high self-
esteem felt more powerful and relied less on contextual cues than individuals with high 
self-esteem who adopted a neutral posture with the arms loose to both sides of the body. 
When crossing arms, people with low self-esteem felt less powerful than people with 
high self-esteem, but not more or less powerful than when adopting a neutral posture. 
However we did find that arm crossing led low self-esteem people to rely more heavily on 
contextual cues than in a neutral posture.  
The finding that arm crossing impacts context-dependency, such that lower levels 
of self-esteem led to more context-dependent behavior leads to several interesting routes 
for further research. So far, context-dependency was tested by means of the framed-line 
test, a cognitive task (Kitayama, et al., 2003). It would be interesting to investigate 
different effects of context-dependency in consumer settings. Anchoring effects (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974), the attraction and compromise effect (Simonson, 1989) should 
increase for unconfident individuals who cross arms. Also, unconfident individuals who 
cross arms may be easier to persuade by a peer or even a sales person, than when in a 
neutral posture. If follow-up research suggests that some consumers are actually worse 
off when crossing arms, it should be highlighted that it is paradoxical that we found that 
people believe that arm crossing protects them from persuasion attempts. Therefore, it 
may be important to consider consumer welfare and see how people can be made 
conscious of these negative effects.  
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However, first of all it is important to try and replicate this effect. Next, we need 
to further investigate what drives the effect, and test possible alternative explanations for 
our results. We speculate that in interpersonal relationships low self-esteem people may 
associate arm crossing with unsuccessfully trying to protect themselves from persuasion 
attempts by others, whereas high self-esteem people may associate arm crossing with 
successfully overruling persuasion attempts by others. Hence, whereas arm crossing may 
induce feelings of being defensive for low self-esteem people, it may induce feelings of 
unyielding for high self-esteem people. In the general discussion of essay 3 we elaborate 
on one possible way of testing this hypothesis. Another possibility is that arm crossing 
leads to a similar impact on one variable that in its turn has a different impact dependent 
on one‟s self-esteem. For example, the effect may be driven by different interpretations 
of interpersonal distance. Arm crossing could enlarge interpersonal distance and 
increase focus on the self. Thereby it could make individuals with lower feelings of self-
esteem feel less secure, and make individuals with high self-esteem feel more secure, 
self-confident and in control. It is important to test for this alternative hypothesis in 
follow-up research. One final alternative explanation for our results is that arm crossing 
with an erect body posture (as participants were seated with the back upright against the 
chair) is compatible with feeling confident, but incompatible with feeling insecure. If low 
self-esteem individuals were to sit with the arms crossed and with shoulders downwards, 
this may feel more comfortable and familiar and thereby induce heightened feelings of 
power. It is worth investigating a compatibility explanation of our findings, because 
embodiment research has for instance found that body postures only impacted decision 
making when valence of products and of body posture were in alliance (Förster & Strack, 
1996).  
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THE FUTURE OF EMBODIED AND SITUATED COGNITION 
As noted in the introduction and throughout our essays, recently researchers have 
regained interest in how the body affects decision making (for a review, see Barsalou, 
2008). Simultaneously, researchers started focusing attention to the situated nature of 
cognition (Schwarz, 2006b). These were radical reactions against abstract cognitive 
theories which describe decision makers as constructing, activating and applying 
abstract symbolic representations (like schemas and prototypes in psychology, or 
utilities in economy) (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Niedenthal, et al., 2005). In many 
different domains of research, it was stressed that higher order cognition does not take 
place in isolation of the outer world or the body. For example, preference construction 
and the usage of stereotypes depend highly on the situation (Bettman, et al., 1998; Smith 
& Semin, 2007). Researchers argue that it is adaptive to construe concepts online, with 
the situation providing interesting building blocks for facilitating information 
processing.  
The past decade, a wealth of research findings have challenged classic views of 
abstract cognition and demonstrated that cognition is at least to some extent grounded 
in situations and physical experiences. Debate has started about the future of 
embodiment. In 2010, consumer researchers organized a preconference about embodied 
cognition at the annual North-American conference of the Association for Consumer 
Research. This was followed by a roundtable discussion at the same conference in 2011 
where further directions for research on the role of embodiment in consumer behaviors 
are developed. I believe that some predictions that Barsalou (2010) put forward about 
the future of grounded cognition are important in advancing research about consumer 
behavior. First, we should go past demonstration studies about embodiment and 
situated cognition and have more developed theories on when and why situations or 
bodily influences affect consumers‟ decisions. This could tell us more about the adaptive 
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nature of flexible decision making. Also, by incorporating embodied and situated 
mechanisms into classic cognitive phenomena, like preference construction, contextual 
factors will become integral parts of enriched theories about consumer behavior. Finally, 
insights from developmental science, artificial intelligence and neuroscience will be 
indispensable to make progress in understanding consumers‟ minds. I would advocate 
our research agendas to become more multidisciplinary, and have different domains of 
research benefit from complementary expertise about grounded cognition. 
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